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ABSTRACT 
We investigate two plausible factors that may have affected changes in wage 
inequality: returns to higher education and returns to new technologies. The first two chapters 
examine the role of mathematics and verbal ability in estimating returns to advanced degrees. 
When average abilities within the major are treated as missing variables, we found that OLS 
estimates of returns to graduate education are underestimated. When average ability in the 
major is treated as part of an endogenous decision regarding whether to attend post-graduate 
degree programs, we find that students in majors with higher average mathematics skills are 
less likely to progress beyond the bachelor's degree while the opposite happens with average 
verbal skills. 
The next two chapters examine the decision of whether to adopt Internet and 
computer technologies and the returns to adoption. We first identify demand-side and 
supply-side factors that affect technology adoption in urban and rural areas. Local access to 
high speed Internet plays an important role in the technology adoption decision. It increases 
the probability of using computers and the Internet for work from home and also increases 
the likelihood of using the Internet at work. That factor alone explains about half of the gap 
in Internet adoption at home or at work between urban and rural workers. Together, the 
demand and supply-side factors identified in the analysis completely explain the differences 
in technology adoption between urban and rural areas. 
Using the previous model to identify the endogenous probability of adopting various 
information technologies, we estimate returns to adoption in the context of an earnings 
function. When treated as exogenous, adoption has an implausibly large positive and 
significant effect on earnings. When the endogeneity of the choice to adopt is controlled, the 
V 
estimated returns to adoption shrink in both sign and significance. Thus, while adoption is 
strongly tied to the availability of high-speed Internet in the home county, the higher income 
of adopters is due to factors that raise both the probability of adoption and earnings and not 
to the adoption per se. 
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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Wage inequality has increased since the 1980's in the United States. Using data from 
the March Current Population Survey (CPS), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) showed that, 
for men, annual earnings inequality increased slowly in the 1970's and more rapidly in the 
1980's. For women, annual earnings inequality declined modestly in the 1970's, but 
increased in the 1980's. For both men and women, increasing inequality in earnings was 
driven by increased wage variation rather than increased variation in hours worked. 
Inequality continued to increase in the 1990s among the youngest cohorts of workers (Card 
and Lemieux (2001)). Katz and Autor's (1999) summary of the literature on changes in the 
U.S. wage structure concluded that wage inequality increased substantially from the late 
1970s to the mid-1990s. They also point out that wage inequality increased within 
demographic and skill groups so that there is greater variation in wages for workers with the 
same education level. These within group wage discrepancies were much larger in the mid-
1990s than 1970s. 
In this study we investigate two plausible factors that may have affected changes in 
wage inequality: returns to higher education and returns to new technologies, namely 
computer and the Internet skills. In chapter 2, we investigate returns to post college 
educations and the role of mathematical and verbal skills by major. Treating ability within 
the major as a missing variables problem, we estimate returns to graduate and professional 
degrees and direct returns to major level mathematical and verbal skills. Least squares 
estimates of returns to schooling that exclude major level ability are shown to be biased 
downward. Adding measures of major level ability shows much larger estimated returns to 
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graduate education. Under plausible assumptions, we argue that these corrected estimates are 
lower bound measures of the true returns to graduate education. 
In chapter 3, we treat the decision to attend graduate school as an endogenous choice. 
The graduate school entry decision is assumed to depend on average mathematical and verbal 
skills in the major as well as anticipated returns to graduate or professional education. Using 
parents' education level and graduate schooling cost measures as instruments in a first stage 
model explaining graduate and professional school entry, we are able to then use the 
predicted probability of completing a Master's, doctorate or professional degree in a second 
stage earnings function. Results show a statistically significant role for mathematics and 
verbal skills in the schooling choice. Consistent with the implication of chapter 2, students in 
majors with higher average mathematics skills are less likely to progress beyond the 
bachelor's degree while students in majors with higher average verbal skills are more likely 
to obtain post graduate education. Direct returns to mathematics and verbal skills were 
statistically insignificant after controlling for the endogenous choice of how long to go to 
school. As in chapter 2, consideration of the role of ability in the schooling decision greatly 
increases estimates of the return to post-graduate education. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the computer and the Internet technology adoption decisions. 
Using a probit model, we identify demand-side and supply-side factors that affect various 
technology adoption decisions in urban and rural areas. Results show that high speed 
Internet access plays major a role in computer or Internet use. Differences in individual 
demand factors and Internet access between urban and rural areas completely explains 
observed regional differences in technology adoption often referred to as the urban-rural 
digital divide. 
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We evaluate the returns to information technology adoption in chapter 5. Using the 
estimation results from chapter 4, we identify the endogenous technology adoption decision 
in the context of an earnings function that is used to estimate returns to computer and the 
Internet use. We find positive, large and statistically significant returns to information 
technology adoption when the technology uses are treated as exogenous. However the 
earnings premium associated with technology adoption shrinks in magnitude and becomes 
statistically insignificant when we control for the endogeneity of technology use. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE ROLE OF MISSING MEASURES OF MATHEMATICAL AND 
VERBAL SKILLS ON RETURNS TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
I. Background 
Wage inequality has increased since the 1980's in the United States. Using data from 
the March Current Population Survey (CPS), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) showed that, 
for men, annual earnings inequality moved from stability or gradual increases in the 70's to 
rapid increases in the 80's. For women, annual earnings inequality moved from a modest 
decline in the 70's to increases in the 80's. For both men and women, increased inequality in 
earnings was driven by increased wage variation rather than increased variation in hours 
worked. 
The increasing wage inequality has been accompanied by increasing returns to 
college education during the 1980's (Balckbum, Bloom, and Freeman (1990), Levy and 
Murnane (1992), Katz and Revenga (1989) and Murphy and Welch (1992)). The college 
wage premium relative to high school graduates sharply increased in the late 80's (Katz and 
Murphy (1992) and Murphy and Welch (1989)) and increased further in 1990's especially for 
young college graduates (Card and Lemieux (2001)).' While steadily increasing returns to 
schooling seem to be able to explain some of the recent rise in wage inequality, much of the 
increase is due to skills other than years of schooling or experience (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce 
(1993)). Katz and Murphy (1992), using March Current Population Survey from 1964-1988, 
found that within group inequality that is due to differences in individual skills and ability 
increased 30 percent in 1987 relative to 1970? 
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One line of research focuses on the role of college majors on within group wage 
inequality. Some majors, business and engineering for example, pay better than others 
(Bishop (1991), Berger (1988a, b), James, Alsalam, Conaty, and To (1989) and Rumberger 
(1984)). For example, Rumberger and Thomas (1993), using the 1987 Survey of Recent 
College Graduates, found that, for both men and women, graduates in engineering and health 
have the highest relative salaries. Women majoring in engineering and health have a higher 
relative wage advantage than men. Next to follow are science or mathematics and business 
majors. Education, social science and humanities majors receive the lowest earnings. Berger 
(1988b) found that, for male workers, engineering undergraduates command the highest 
starting salaries while liberal arts graduates are paid the least. Business graduate salaries lie 
in the middle as are all other majors, presumably. Moreover, the gap in salaries has been 
widening. Over the period from 1960 to 1981, engineering salaries have grown the fastest, 
followed by science, business and the liberal arts. 
Many studies have examined the role of ability on estimated returns to schooling. 
Appropriate ability measures can be used to explain within group inequality controlling for 
levels of education as well as between groups wage inequalities. If latent abilities or 
cognitive skills are excluded, estimates of returns to schooling will be biased, presuming that 
these abilities and years of schooling are correlated.3 However there has been no concrete 
evidence whether excluded ability measures could explain some of the recent increase in 
returns to schooling or the college wage premium.4 
Some evidence has been advanced that returns to cognitive skills have risen (Juhn, 
Murphy and Pierce (1993)). Researchers have used measures of mathematics and verbal 
abilities to control for cognitive skills in estimating earnings functions. Murnane, Willett, and 
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Levy (1995), using data from two longitudinal surveys of American high school seniors, the 
National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS72) for 1972 and High 
School and Beyond (HS&B) for the class of 1980, showed that the impact of basic cognitive 
skills on wages increased between 1972 and 1986.5 They argue that this increase in returns to 
cognitive skills is due to recent technology favoring skilled workers. In addition to that, they 
showed that the mathematics score in the model completely absorbs the wage premium from 
college students for females and reduces its magnitude for males from 100 percent to 62 
percent. Levine and Zimmerman (1995) tested whether taking more high school math and 
science classes had an impact on wages. Using data sets from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY) of 1979 and HS&B of 1980, they found that additional high school 
math classes increased the wages of women college graduates. For both men and women, 
high school science classes appear to have no significant impact on wages. Grogger and Hide 
(1995) tried to measure cognitive ability using standardized test scores and high school 
grades. Using data from NLS72 and HS&B of 1980, they found that skills attained prior to 
college had no impact on changes in the college wage premium for men. However they found 
that the math score had a significant impact on wages for women. They argue that recent 
estimates of the increasing college wage premium that fail to account for math ability may 
overstate the increase in the value of a college education for women. Moll (1998), using 
South Africa data, found that even mastery of a primary school level of cognitive skill had a 
significant impact on wages. Boissiere, Knight, and Sabot (1985) argue, in their work on East 
Africa that the main cause of the difference in earnings between primary and secondary 
educated workers was their cognitive skill differences. 
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This study explores several questions that have not been addressed in the previous 
literature. First, while the increase in average returns to schooling and the college wage 
premium have been well documented, few studies have focused on higher levels of education. 
Most studies on returns to schooling have focused on the earnings difference between high 
school graduates and college graduates. However, as shown in Figure 1, relative returns to 
post graduate degrees have risen steadily in the 1980's and have outpaced the gains to 
bachelor's degrees in the 1990's. This rise in returns to post graduate education has not been 
investigated. 
Second, studies using college major variables to explain wages show a significant 
difference in returns to college majors, but the reasoning is somewhat vague. Berger (1988) 
found that the cohort size effects of business and engineering majors are smaller or 
insignificant where as the effect is negative for science and liberal arts graduates. This could 
imply that usual demand and supply analysis for different wage premiums of different 
college majors may not be appropriate. Grogger and Eide (1995) found that there are 
significant differences in wage premium among different college majors and they also found 
that there are substantial amount of wage premium due to college skills by different college 
majors. Studies have also found that the significant impact of cognitive skills on earnings 
functions, but they have concentrated on measures of cognitive skills at very basic levels of 
math or reading ability.6 However, wage inequality is increasing more rapidly at higher 
levels of education. Grogger and Eide (1995) also reported that pre-college test scores and 
high school grades have no effect on changes in the college wage premium for men, but that 
choice of college major is highly significant. Assuming college major dummy variables 
indirectly control for college skills, their results may reveal that lower levels of cognitive 
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skills are not as important as the skills acquired in specific college majors, and it is these 
latter skills that drive the changes in the college premium. Since college skills seem to reflect 
a substantial portion of the college wage premium, at least for men, it is interesting to 
examine the role of more educated cognitive skills on earnings.7 In this paper we are going 
to estimate returns to college major level cognitive skills. Finding its significance will give us 
one reason of persistence and even increasing major specific college wage premium. 
Lastly, this paper deals with the bias on measured returns to schooling coefficients. 
Studies argue that unmeasured skills are positively correlated with years of schooling, but the 
evidence is not strong. Using high school or lower levels of cognitive skills to proxy missing 
ability, several studies have found that missing ability causes a positive bias on estimated 
returns to schooling.8 Although the measures of cognitive skills in this paper are aggregated 
at the college major level, it would be interesting to see whether this result holds at higher 
levels of schooling and cognitive skills. 
Section II discussed theoretical background of the log earnings function and missing 
ability bias in least squares estimation. Section III discusses the data, section IV discusses the 
estimation strategy, section V reports the estimation results, and section VI includes 
conclusions. 
II. Theoretical Background 
Human Capital Earnings Function and Ability Bias in OLS Estimation 
Almost all the recent empirical research on education and earnings is based on the 
human capital earnings function (HCEF) developed by Mincer (1974) and Becker (1967).9 
Their log-linear earnings function is statistical in nature, although it fits the data remarkably 
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(Heckman and Polacheck (1974), Card and Kruger (1992), and Park (1994)).10 Followed by 
Mincer (1974), much of applied work in economics of education has used a version of the 
following equation in estimation: 
(1) yt  = l n %  =P0+PS S i +X, Px 
where Y, is a measure of earnings, S, is a measure of schooling, X, is a vector of other 
variables assumed to affect earnings such as experience, experience squared, race, and so on, 
and ut is a random disturbance term. 
To derive unbiased estimates of the coefficient in earnings function, it must be that 
the disturbance term is not correlated with the independent variables. However, if individual 
ability, which is believed to be correlated with schooling, is omitted from the earnings 
function, then this condition will be violated. A simple example by Griliches (1977), 
suppressing subscripts, illustrates this point very well. Let 
(2) y=w#g", 
(3) , 
(4) y = \nY-\nw + SsS + ôfliLi + u, 
where w is market rental price of a unit of human capital that may vary over time and space, 
H is the unobservable quantity of human capital, and u is other, random influences on 
earnings that is normally distributed with the zero mean.11 Equation (3) is an implicit human 
capital production function with time spent in schooling (S) and ability ( /u ) that affects 
quality of human capital and the efficiency of schooling, and Ss and A are parameters.12 As 
we mentioned, to have consistent estimates of coefficients, S and jU should not be correlated 
with u. However, when we estimate equation (4) without //, we end up estimating 
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(5) y = \nY = \nw+8s S + o, 
where v = 8 ju + u. 
The least square estimate of schooling coefficient will be 
; £(•s - s x y - y )  
(6) 
' ' 
where S and y are sample means of schooling and income. Substitute v for (y-p)in (6) and 
rearrange to get 
] T ( S - S ) u  
0) = S, +• 
E(s-s)! 
,  , ,  Z ( s - s ) ' ' ,  E ( s - s ) .  
5  
" X ( S - S ) 2  Z < S - S ) =  
E ( s - s ) 2  
Asymptotically, this converges to 
COV{JJ,S) (8) 
Far(S) 
The direction of the bias will depend on the sign of & and the sign of the covariance 
between ability and schooling. Theoretically, the direction of the bias is ambiguous. The '8 , 
the market price of the individual cognitive skills, is assumed to be positive. The ambiguity 
of the bias comes in the correlation between n and S. Years of schooling could increase the 
value of the cognitive skills, but the higher value of the cognitive skills would make the time 
out of school more valuable.13 The sign of the correlation between schooling and cognitive 
skills is not clear. 
Many empirical studies using less than college level of test scores on mathematics 
and language ability as a proxy of cognitive skills, report an upward bias in the schooling 
coefficient in the absence of measures of cognitive skills. This implies that the correlation 
between ability and years of schooling is positive. One of our objectives is to establish 
whether this relationship between cognitive skills and schooling variables holds for higher 
levels of education. 
III. Data 
The data set analyzed in this paper is collected from three sources. The main 
individual information is taken from the Scientist and Engineer Statistics Data System 
(SESTAT) of the National Science Foundation (NSF). To this, we merge in data on average 
cognitive skills by major from the Educational Testing Service (ETS). We also use 
information on the total number of doctorate recipients and the number of doctorate 
recipients who are not US citizens by major from the Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED) 
collected by the Division of Science Resources Statistics (SRS) of NSF. Brief explanations of 
each data set follows in order. 
SESTAT Data 
We use the 1993 Scientist and Engineer Statistics Data System (SESTAT) data set 
collected by National Science Foundation (NSF). SESTAT is a database of the employment, 
education, and demographic characteristics of the nation's scientists and engineers. The data 
are collected from the following three surveys: the National Survey of College Graduates, the 
National Survey of Recent College Graduates, and the Survey of Doctorate Recipients. What 
is special about 1993 SESTAT is that it also includes the non-science and engineering (S&E) 
population. The 1993 National Survey of College Graduates was a once-a-decade baseline 
survey that also covered the non-S&E population with bachelor's or higher degree of about 
29 million people. The 1993 SESTAT, therefore, represents the population of all bachelor's 
degree recipients in the United States. 
The SESTAT data includes college graduates whose bachelor's degrees were earned 
between 1939 and 1992. The data includes information on individual demographics, parents' 
education level, year of college graduation, year of highest degree received, and salary. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study are reported in Table 1. The 
education categories of SESTAT are listed under 6 major groups. They are further 
subdivided into detailed majors. To correspond with the ETS and SED data sets, the detailed 
majors were allocated to 27 major groups and a catchall group of majors that did not fit the 
ETS fields. Engineering is the most populated major and public administration is the least. 
About 35 percent of the sample has a highest degree at the bachelor's level, 23 percent are 
master's degree holders, and 37 percent have the PhD. About 5 percent hold professional 
degrees in the sample. The average salary is slightly less than $55,000. Average salary, as we 
can see in Table 2, is higher for Whites and Asians than Blacks and Native Americans. Male 
salary is 25.6 percent higher than female. Chemistry and physics are among top paid majors 
when linguistics and social work are lowest paid majors. Average age is about forty years old. 
GRE Data 
Our measure of cognitive skills is based on average quantitative and verbal test scores 
by intended major on the Graduate Records Examination (GRE). The Educational Testing 
Service (ETS) provided this data by selected years: 1963, 1974 to 1976, 1983 to 1986, and 
1997 to 2000. The number of majors included in the report varied from 21 majors in 1963; to 
92 majors in 1974 - 76; to 98 majors in 1983 - 86; and to 200 majors in 1997 - 2000. These 
were aggregated into 28 major groups. Of the 28 majors, 9 were not available in 1963. These 
were placed into the closest included major, so computer science was placed in mathematics, 
architecture was placed in music and so on. Once consistent data series were generated for 
the four reporting dates, the values were interpolated to generate continuous values for the 
intervening years. As most average scores change very slowly, this process is unlikely to 
generate wildly inaccurate estimates of average scores by major. 
The trends of the quantitative, the verbal, and the Iowa Test of Basic Skills scores are 
reported in Figure 2. Scales of all series are normalized to 1 at 1963. The data show that both 
quantitative and verbal scores increased from 1963 to 1975, but decreased from 1975 to 1985. 
From 1985 to 1998, quantitative scores increased again but verbal scores kept decreasing at a 
slower rate. Bishop (1989) reported annual average scores on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills 
(ITBS) by Iowa Test of Educational Development (ITED) for Iowa students from 1940 to 
1990. Bishop argues that, since the data set includes 95 percent of the public and private 
schools in the state of Iowa that are regularly participated in the testing program, ITED data 
for Iowa is free of selectivity bias and this feature makes ITED trends of test scores better 
representation of national trends prior to 1970 than the American College Test (ACT), the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), and the American Council on Education Psychological 
Exam. Since these other tests were at first taken by a highly selected group and only more 
recently by more representative samples of college students, the trends of these tests' scores 
are biased by the decreasing selectivity of those who took the test. The scores on the 12th 
grade test increased from 1940 to 1970, decreased from 1970 to 1980, and increased 
thereafter. This trend shows almost the same pattern as the GRE quantitative score. The time 
difference of the peak and the trough for the two series is about 6.5 years, which makes sense 
considering it takes four to five years to graduate from college. 
Individuals are allocated GRE scores based on their major. Based on that, sample 
statistics on GRE scores by different categories of variables are reported in Tables 3 and 4. 
Female GRE scores are 1.6 percent higher on the verbal test and 6.8 percent lower on the 
quantitative test than males. Asians get the highest average quantitative score among 
different races and bachelor's degree recipients have highest quantitative scores than other 
degree recipients. Professional degree holders and Native American get the best average 
scores in the verbal test. 
Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED) Data 
The decrease in the GRE verbal score after 1985 is somewhat different from the 
ITED score trend. We suspect that the decline might be related to an increase in the number 
of foreign students taking the GRE. The data from Survey of Earned Doctorates (SED) by the 
Division of Science Resources Statistics (SRS) of the NSF includes the total number of 
doctorate recipients and the number of doctorate recipients who are not US citizens by major. 
We took the ratio of these foreign graduates to total graduates as an approximation of the 
ratio of foreign students taking the GRE. Since the SED reports the year when the student 
received the doctorate degree, we subtracted six years from the SED data to make it 
consistent with the year an individual would be expected to have received the bachelors' 
degree and taken the GRE. The time series of the ratio is shown in Figures 3 and 4. The ratio 
increases from 10 percent at 1963 to 27 percent in 1985 and stabilizes at about 25 percent 
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after that. The trend increases sharply between the late 1960's and the mid 1980's. This is 
consistent with the pattern of GRE verbal scores during the same period. The correlation 
coefficient between the ratio and the GRE verbal score is -0.34 and the correlation 
coefficient between the ratio and the quantitative is 0.72. The percentage of foreign students 
is highest in chemistry and lowest in psychology. 
IV. Estimation Model 
Griliches (1977) dealt with missing observations on individual level ability. Our 
application includes a level of average ability at the major level, but we do not observe how 
well one individual performs relative to other majors. To demonstrate the implications for 
estimation, suppose an individual i in major j has ability 
where //" is average ability across all individuals in major /, and e:j = /j:j - / / " ,  i s  i n d i v i d u a l  
/'s ability relative to others in major /. We call the former "major component" and the latter 
"individual component." By definition E [eyj/] = 0 and Cov(fiM ,e) = 0 . The covariance 
between schooling and individual ability will have two terms: Cov(S,/uM ) and Cov(S,e). 
Inserting (9) into (4), we have 
( 10) ytJ = In Yy = In w, + <5s $i + + eij ) + £, 
= In wi  + Ss S: + etJ + sj. 
If we do not have any measure of individual or major level ability, we estimate 
17 
(11) Vij — ln Yjj — In ma + 5S Sl  + , 
where ^ ^ +e^ )+g,. 
Then the least squares estimate of the schooling coefficient will be 
Z A - S H  (12) À = 4 + 
Z.(S,-S)2 
s  
"  E , ( S , - S ) =  + s ' Y A S - S f  S ' Y ^ s - s f  
, . , z;=l E2,to-S)K-^). r u . , , 
'  X A - - s ' I 2  "  E . ( S , - S ) 2  '  y  
7, 2, and I = nj + ri2 + .. + nj. 
Asymptotically, this converges to 
Therefore, the bias due to missing ability measure is 
(14) B =Ss-Ss=S C°V(M , S) + g Cov(e, S) w^jcj1 js equaj t0 the bias term in equation 
(8). We call the first term B\ and the second term B2 in the right hand side of the equation 
(14). When major level ability, //", is included in the estimation, the bias term is to B2 
^ Cov(e,S) 
" %;r(S) 
There are three possibilities in terms of the bias. One is 
when Cov(/iM, S) = Cov(e, S) = 0. In this case, we would get an unbiased estimate of 
schooling from direct estimation of (11). Second is when Cov(juM ,S) * 0 but Cov(e,S) = 0 
so that years of schooling is related to average ability in the major but not to the difference 
between the individual's ability and the average major. We can still get an unbiased estimate 
of the schooling coefficient by including a measure of major level ability in the earnings 
function as in (10). 
The last case is when Cov(juM, S) ^  0 and Cov(e, S) ^  0. In this case, there is no 
guarantee that inclusion of major level ability will yield a smaller bias. If the covariance 
terms have opposite signs , the size of B will depends on the relative sizes of Bj and B2. Only 
when Sign(Cov(S, fiM )) = Sign(Cov(S, e)) will B > B2. It might seem likely that if average 
ability in the major is positively correlated with schooling, then individuals with above 
average ability within the major would be the most likely to obtain an advanced degree, but 
there is no guarantee. 
In our empirical work below, we present evidence that the least squares estimate 
excluding major ability is smaller than the least squares estimate when major ability is 
included. If Sign(Cov(S, piM )) = Sign(Cov(S, e)) and if S/J>Q, then it must be true that 
Cov(juM ,S)<0 and taking the assumption that the signs of the covariance terms should be 
equal, that Cov(e,S) < 0. If SM< 0, then the opposite covariance signs would hold. It turns 
out that we use two different measures of major-level ability whose inclusion raise the 
estimated 3$. If our assumption that Cov(e, S) will have the same sign holds, then any 
remaining bias due to unmeasured individual ability will be in the same direction, suggesting 
that we will have a lower bound estimate of the true returns to schooling. 
To estimate the role of cognitive ability and the effect of college majors on earnings, 
we estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models as follows: 
(15) In Yj=/30+Eduj/3l+Xjj32+ul  , 
(16) ln%=#, +&/%, ^ +w, 
(17) In Yj  = /?0 + Edut  /?, + Xjj32 + Major fi5 + ut  , 
(18) In Y j = f i 0 +  E d u j  / ? ,  +  X t  [ i 2  +  G R E f i ^  +  M a j o r , P 5  +  u t  ,  
where Eduj includes education level dummy variables such as bachelor's degree, master's 
degree, PhD and professional degree, GREj includes the average GRE quantitative and verbal 
scores by major, Xt includes control variables such as experience, experience squared, and 
dummy variables indicating whether the individual is male, a US citizen, or Hispanic, White, 
Black, Asian, or Native American. The equation (15) is the base equation to be compared 
with the other three equations: the reference is a white female non-US citizen who has 
bachelor's degree. 
To see the effect of cognitive skills on earnings, equation (16) includes the variables 
in (15) plus a vector of measures of the average cognitive skills in major. This vector 
includes the average GRE quantitative and verbal scores by major.14 Comparing equation 
(15) and (16), we would capture the role of cognitive skills on earnings function and how the 
cognitive skills are related to schooling variables. We expect coefficients of both verbal and 
quantitative score variables are positive. 
Equation (18) includes the variables in (17) plus Major„ a vector of 28 major 
dummies used as an alternative skills measure: the reference major is public administration. 
The comparison of the regression results of equation (16) with (17) will determine the extent 
to which differences in GRE scores by major explain the differences in returns to major. 
Equation (18) includes all the variables discussed above. The other equations are restricted 
forms of (18), allowing for joint significance tests for the Major, and GRE, vectors. 
V. Estimation Results 
Table 5 presents parameter estimates and associated standard errors for each 
regression model discussed in section III. The omitted category for the schooling dummies is 
the bachelor's degree; for parents' education level it is the high school graduate; and for the 
college major it is public administration. The racial dummies use White as the reference 
group. 
Schooling, Experiences, and Other control Variables 
The estimates of the regressions are consistent with theoretical expectation and 
estimates of other studies (Grogger and Eide (1995), Moll (1998), Blackburn and Neumark 
(1995), Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995)).15 Schooling dummy coefficients are positive 
and significant in all four regression models. The PhD degree has twice the impact on 
earnings as a master's degree. Professional degrees have the largest impact on earnings. The 
magnitudes of the experience coefficients lie between 0.026 in the base model and 0.041 in 
the model 18. The coefficients of squared experience were negative and small, which implies 
that the effect of experience on wage is positive but of decreasing rate. Minorities earn less 
than Whites and the difference is biggest between White and Native Americans. Post-
doctorate (postdoc) position is considered as on the job training. We can also see that 
workers in that position receive about 40 percent less than others. 
College Major and GRE Scores 
The sign of the coefficient of the quantitative score is positive when the sign of the 
verbal score is negative and both are significant. This result is consistent with studies 
conducted at lower levels of education.16 Most studies found that, when both math and verbal 
scores are included in a model, the math score was positive and significant and the verbal 
score was either positive or insignificant. Adding test scores raises the R-square by 21 
percent relative to the baseline equation. This may imply that test scores explain substantial 
amount of the wage variation. 
Adding college major dummies to the baseline equation as a measure of skill content 
instead of GRE scores results in a regression that is remarkably similar to the one using GRE 
scores averaged by majors as the measure of skill content. Comparing coefficients on the 
same variable between equations (16) and (17), we find that most are almost identical 
qualitatively and quantitatively. As we can see from equation (18), we do not gain much 
explanatory power by using both GRE test scores and college major dummies together. The 
R-square is only 5 percent higher for equation 18 than for equation 16. Again, coefficients on 
the common variables in equations (16) and (18) except the test scores and major dummies 
are also identical to those in equation (16). It appears that the test scores explain almost as 
much wage variations as the college major dummy variables do. The estimates of coefficients 
of majors in natural science, social science, or arts are significant and negative. 
The coefficient estimates of variables such as gender, nationality, experience, and 
schooling are affected by adding either GRE test scores or college major dummies. Postdoc, 
race, and regional variables do not seem to be correlated with these ability variables. The 
most interesting results will be the changes in coefficient estimates of schooling variables 
due to addition of GRE scores. They are 8 to 10 percent higher with test scores than without 
them. As we can see in equation (14), the sign of the bias of OLS estimates is determined by 
the sign of the coefficients of major average ability variable and the correlation between the 
variable of the interest and the major average ability variable. The sign of the coefficient on 
the quantitative score is positive and the coefficient on the verbal score is negative. Table 6 
shows the shares of the people whose GRE scores are low, middle, or high for both verbal 
and quantitative scores by different degree level.17 For Quantitative score, the ratio of the 
share of the high score group to the share of the low score group of BA holders is about 70 
percent larger than those of MA or Ph.D. holders. In contrast, the ratio of the share of the 
high score group to the share of the low score group of BA holders for GRE verbal score is 
about 10 percent smaller than that of MA and about 30 percent smaller than that of Ph.D. 
holders. That is, the relative proportion of high GRE quantitative scorer is higher in BA 
holders than in MA or in Ph.D. holders, when the relative proportion of high GRE verbal 
scorer is lower in BA holders than in MA or in Ph.D. holders. This is evidence that the 
correlation between the verbal score and schooling is positive, but that the GRE quantitative 
score and schooling are negatively correlated. One possible explanation for this result is that 
students who have good mathematics skills do not seek advanced degrees because of their 
higher opportunity cost of staying school. However, verbal skills are not valued as highly in 
the market, so students who have good verbal skills decide to stay in school longer. 
Recall in equation (14) the bias term due to missing major level component in the 
coefficient estimate of schooling enters in the product form of A and Cov(juM ,S). For GRE 
quantitative scores, Sfl >0, but the covariance is negative. For GRE verbal scores, <5 <0, but 
the covariance is positive. Therefore in both cases, the bias is negative, suggesting that the 
OLS estimate understates the true return. Furthermore, if the bias attributable to unmeasured 
individual ability within the major goes in the same direction, then our corrected measure of 
the returns to graduate education will be a lower bound of the true return. 
If the bias due to the unmeasured individual ability component, B j ,  has an opposite 
sign with the bias term due to the major component, B2, we cannot be certain about the size 
or sign of the combined total bias term, B. To get an idea about the sign of the correlation 
between unmeasured individual ability and the choice to pursue an advanced degree, we 
examine the residuals from the earnings function. The residuals represent unmeasured 
individual ability as well as any other unmeasured individual heterogeneity that affects 
earnings including luck. We run an auxiliary regression of education choices on the earnings 
residuals using multinomial logit. The sign of the coefficient will show the direction of 
combined effect of unobserved math and verbal ability on schooling choices. However, the 
estimated coefficients will be biased toward zero because the residual measures ability with 
error. 
Table 7 reports the estimated marginal effect of the earnings residuals on the 
probability to pursue each degree. The sign pattern suggests that higher unmeasured ability 
lowers the probability of pursuing doctoral or professional degrees. However the coefficients 
are very small and not statistically significant. One interpretation is that the covariance 
between unmeasured ability and schooling is zero and so our major level ability correction 
fully controls for the bias, B. 
It is hard to explain what this result represents if there exist correlations between 
unmeasured math and verbal ability and schooling. Recall that we need to know both the sign 
of correlation between ability and schooling and the sign of return to that ability to determine 
the sign of the ability bias in the returns to schooling. 
The unmeasured ability in the residuals includes both unmeasured math and 
unmeasured verbal ability. We cannot measure separate correlations between the 
unmeasured math and verbal abilities with schooling, but only the sum of the two 
correlations. If the unobserved ability effect is the same as the observed ability effects, they 
will go in opposite directions and they may cancel each other, consistent with our finding that 
the combined correlations are insignificant. However, if the true summed effect is negative 
(so that the finding of insignificance is due to measurement error), then we cannot infer the 
sign of the bias term because we do not know the sign of the return to unmeasured math and 
verbal ability. It is possible to have a sizable bias, B2, even though the correlations cancel 
each other, if the returns to unmeasured math ability have a different sign than the returns to 
unmeasured verbal ability. It is also possible to have B2 close to zero depending on sign of 
returns to unmeasured ability when the sum of the two correlations of unmeasured math 
ability and schooling and of unmeasured verbal ability and schooling is negative. Therefore, 
we can not be certain if the corrected effect with measured ability makes the returns to 
schooling closer to the truth or not. 
This result is opposite to the results of other studies. Grogger and Eide (1995), 
Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995), and Blackburn and Neumark (1995) used high school 
level test scores for measures of cognitive skills in earnings function and they found that 
schooling coefficient is overestimated due to omission of ability variables. These seemingly 
different results can be explained. At lower levels of education, students with more math 
ability stay longer in school because returns to cognitive skills and returns to additional 
schooling are relatively larger than the opportunity cost of schooling. After college, 
opportunity cost for post college education increases more rapidly than returns to schooling. 
For those who have good cognitive skills, the opportunity cost is even higher since the skills 
are highly valued in labor market. 
Returns to GRE Scores and Returns to Changes of College Major Distribution 
Based on the estimation results in table 5 we simulate the impact of changes in GRE 
scores and in choice of college majors on earnings of the sample from 1963 to 1993. First, to 
see the impact of GRE scores, we hold all other variables except the mean GRE verbal and 
the mean quantitative scores at their sample means over the period.18 To get pure variations 
of GRE scores net of the effect of changes in the ratio of the foreign graduates to total 
graduates, we regress both GRE scores on the ratio and collect residuals to get "pure" GRE 
scores. This GRE scores net of the ratio effect are in figure 5. There is not much dramatic 
change in the shape of GRE verbal score, but the dipping point in GRE quantitative score 
around 1985 is down much deeper compared to the GRE unadjusted quantitative score in 
figure 2. We use this purged GRE scores in the following earnings simulation. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the impact of changes in average verbal and quantitative skills 
on earnings by bachelor's degree cohort. Over time, as shown in Figure 5, GRE verbal scores 
rise from 1963 through 1975 and decrease thereafter. Quantitative scores rise from 1963 to 
1975, decrease, and then rise again after 1986. Holding all other variables at their sample 
means, the simulations in Figure 6 show the comparative static impact of changes in GRE 
scores by major on the earnings of successive cohorts of college graduates. Three paths: 1) 
only the GRE verbal score changes, holding the quantitative score constant at its sample 
mean; 2) only the GRE quantitative score changes, holding the verbal score constant at its 
sample mean; and 3) both scores are allowed to change. 
When only the verbal score changes the path of the simulated earnings shows the 
opposite pattern of the trend of the verbal score since the coefficient of the verbal score is 
negative. The simulated earnings decrease by 5 percent from 1963 to 1975, and then increase 
by 4.2 percent thereafter. Overall, changes in GRE verbal scores account for a very slight 
decrease in real earnings over the 1963 - 1993 period. The simulated earnings path of the 
quantitative score shows almost the same pattern of GRE quantitative score in figure 5 since 
the coefficient is positive. The earnings increase by 5 percent from 45,164 dollars in 1963 to 
47,378 dollars in 1975. It decreases by 4.2 percent, and increases again by 3 percent 
thereafter. For the whole period, the increase of projected earnings due to the quantitative 
score change is about 1,600 dollars or 3.6 percent. Lastly, the simulated earnings when the 
both scores change increases steadily for the period. It increases moderately from 1963 to 
1983, dipped down for next couple of years, and increase quite strongly after then. The total 
increase of simulated earnings from 1963 to 1993 due to the changes of both scores is 1,205 
dollars; about 2.6 percent. 
Figure 6 shows the impact of changes in choice of college major on earnings by 
bachelor's degree cohort, holding all other variables constant at their sample means. We 
divide the sample period into six four-year sub periods; from 1963 to 1966, 1967 to 1970, 
1971 to 1974, 1975 to 1978, 1979 to 1982, 1983 to 1986, and from 1987 to 1992. We 
calculate the mean distribution of college majors for each sub period. This grouping is 
inevitable to have noticeable variations in choice of college majors since there is not enough 
observations for some college majors in a year. 
Over the whole sample period, 1.8 percent of earnings change is attributed to the 
changes in the distribution of college majors. The simulated earnings trend shows that it 
decreases in 1960's and early 1970's by about 1.1 percent from 46,776 to 46,253 dollars, 
stabilizes in early 1970's and mid 1970's, and increases after then by 3.1 percent from mid 
1970's to mid 1980's. It dropped slightly after then, about 0.2 percent. 
One interesting aspect of this trend is that it coincides with the Freeman's (1976) 
findings of low returns to college and graduate degrees in the late I960's and the early 
1970's. He attributed the earnings decline to increasing supply of college graduates 
associated with the maturation of the baby boom. Our result reinforces Freeman's findings. 
In addition to substantial increase in the supply of college graduates in the labor market, 
college graduates atypically selected majors with relatively low returns in the late 60's and 
the early 70's. Graduates moved to majors with higher returns after that and the earnings 
change due to the distribution change in college major stabilizes in the late 80's and the early 
90's. 
VI. Conclusions 
This study investigated three research questions on the earnings function: returns to 
post college degrees, impact of cognitive skills by majors on earnings, and ability bias in 
OLS estimation. 
We found that OLS estimates of returns to graduate education are underestimated 
when controls for average ability are missing. Comparing returns to graduate or professional 
degrees of the equation (15) that is not controlled for average ability and of the equation (18) 
that is controlled for average ability with GRE verbal and quantitative scores and college 
major dummies, coefficients of higher degree dummies in the equation (18) are larger than 
those in the equation (15). This result differs from findings in previous studies that looked at 
lower levels of education. Less educated students with more math ability may stay longer in 
school because returns to cognitive skills and returns to additional schooling are relatively 
larger than the opportunity cost of schooling. After college, the opportunity cost for post 
college education increases more rapidly than returns to schooling. For those who have good 
cognitive skills, the opportunity cost is even higher since the skills are highly valued in the 
labor market. 
From the estimation results of the equation (18) in the Table 5, Master's degree 
holder are paid about 12 percent, Ph.D. holders are paid about 25 percent, and professional 
degree holders are paid about 55 percent higher than those who have only bachelor's degree. 
This could be an explanation of increasing earnings inequality among different education 
groups. This result also suggests that we might need to put more attention on higher 
education. For example, if you compared earnings of high school graduates with those of 
college graduates that in fact include the post college educated as well, you might end up 
overstating the value of a college degree. 
Average GRE verbal and quantitative scores by college major play an important role 
in explaining earnings variation. Coefficient on the GRE quantitative score is positive and 
that on GRE verbal score is negative. This could be the evidence that quantitative skills are 
increasing in value in the labor market while the value of verbal skills is steady or falling. We 
confirm this conclusion in the simulation results from Figure 6. The simulated earnings 
differential attributed to changes in the average GRE quantitative and verbal scores by 
college major is about 2.6 percent. Since the impact of the verbal score change on earnings is 
trivial for the sample period as a whole, the 2.6 percent earnings differential is due to changes 
in the quantitative skills only, which is about 1,609 dollars. Considering it in real terms, the 
impact of the quantitative score is substantial. 
Changes in the distribution of major on earnings by cohort also have had an impact 
on the earnings for college graduates. Researches have found that college majors play an 
important role in explaining wage variation. Some majors get paid more than others. The 
simulated earnings in Figure 6 decrease in 60's and early 70's, stabilize in 70's, and increase 
thereafter. This supports the findings of Freeman (1976). He found that low returns to college 
and graduate degrees in late 60's and early 70's and argued that the reason for this decline is 
supply changes in the labor market for the period. The simulation result shows that, as well 
as the increase in the supply of college graduates in labor market, relatively over populated 
college graduates whose returns to major are low could be the reason for his finding in late 
60's and early 70's. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistic of the Data: 1963-1986, observation number: 67565 
Variables Mean Stand. Err. 
Demographics Age 41.2 (0.027) 
Experience 17.4 (0.025) 
Male 0.723 (0.002) 
Citizen 0.956 (0.001) 
Rural Background 0.319 (0.002) 
Postdoc 0.004 (>0.001) 
Education BA 0.549 (0.002) 
MA 0.287 (0.002) 
PHD 0.063 (0.001) 
Professional Degree 0.101 (0.001) 
GRE Score Verbal GRE Mean 503.3 (0.103) 
Quant. GRE Mean 574.9 (0.260) 
Race Hispanic 0.031 (0.001) 
White 0.849 (0.001) 
Black 0.052 (0.001) 
Asian 0.066 (0.001) 
Native American 0.002 (>0.001) 
Salary 53864 (113.3) 
Selected Majors Computer Sci. 0.049 (0.001) 
Agriculture 0.024 (0.001) 
Biology 0.127 (0.001) 
Chemistry 0.041 (0.001) 
Physics 0.026 (0.001) 
Economics 0.052 (0.001) 
Psychology 0.104 (0.001) 
Engineering 0.205 (0.002) 
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Table 2. Average Salary in Different Categories 
Mean Stand. Err. 
Male 57803 (135.7) 
Female 43601 (182.6) 
BA 47900 (161.5) 
MA 53325 (208.7) 
PhD 59657 (165.4) 
Professional Degree 84155 (727.3) 
White 54935 (133.0) 
Black 44187 (364.5) 
Asian 50386 (285.8) 
Native Am. 45295 (1316.7) 
Computer Sci. 52163 (374.0) 
Agriculture 41691 (566.6) 
Biology 57673 (365.8) 
Chemistry 63337 (472.6) 
Physics 58968 (527.6) 
Economics 59886 (780.8) 
Psychology 46937 (388.4) 
Engineering 59753 (193.6) 
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Table 3. Average GRE Verbal Score in 
Different Categories 
Mean Stand. Err. 
Male 
Female 
501.1 (0.12) 
509.1 (0.19) 
BA 
MA 
PhD 
Professional Degree 
500.9 (0.17) 
502.5 (0.23) 
508.4 (0.17) 
515.5 (0.32) 
White 
Black 
Asian 
Native American 
503.7 (0.12) 
505.1 (0.36) 
497.2 (0.29) 
507.0 (1.22) 
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Table 4. Average GRE Quantitative Score in 
Different Categories 
Mean Stand. Err. 
Male 585.3 (0.30) 
Female 547.8 (0.48) 
BA 581.9 (0.44) 
MA 568.7 (0.57) 
PhD 573.0 (0.41) 
Professional Degree 555.7 (0.86) 
White 573.9 (0.30) 
Black 553.2 (1.04) 
Asian 604.0 (0.67) 
Native American 563.2 (3.35) 
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Table 5. OLS Regression coefficients on Log Annual Salary 
15 16 17 18 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
MA 
PhD 
Professional Degree 
0.108**** 
0.226*** 
0.498*" 
0.116*** 
0.240*** 
0.551*** 
0.117*** 
0.253*** 
0.552'" 
0.117*** 
0.253'" 
0.552*" 
Experience/10 
(Experience/10)2 
0.255*** 
-0.039*** 
0.361*** 
-0.054*** 
0.410*** 
-0.075*** 
0.406*** 
-0.074*** 
Male 
Citizen 
Postdoc 
0.248*** 
0.075*** 
-0.403*** 
0.175*** 
0.102*** 
-0.386*** 
0.161*** 
0.105*** 
-0.375*** 
0.161*** 
0.104*** 
-0.373*" 
Verbal Score/100 
Verbal Standard Deviation/100 
Quantitative Score/100 
Quantitative Standard Deviation/100 
Ratio of Foreign Graduate Students 
-0.122*** 
0.031*** 
0.151*** 
-0.026*** 
-0.033 
-0.176*" 
0.008 
0.105*** 
-0.006 
-0.259*** 
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Table 5. (cont'd) 
Computer Sci. 0.087 -0.030 
Mathematics -0.060 -0.153 
Agriculture -0.319*** -0.346*** 
Biology -0.156* -0.206** 
Chemistry -0.030 0.005 
Earth Sci. -0.135 -0.191* 
Physics -0.046 -0.110 
Economics -0.028 -0.057 
Political Sci. -0.144 -0.101 
Psychology -0.205** -0.205" 
Sociology -0.273*** -0.263'" 
Social Work -0.308*** -0.315"' 
Linguistics -0.340*** -0.232" 
Philosophy -0.348*** -0.309*** 
Anthropology -0.202** -0.114 
History -0.250*** -0.186* 
Education -0.245*** -0.292*** 
Business -0.028 -0.092 
Public Administration (dropped) 
Literature -0.175* -0.045 
Foreign Literature -0.171* -0.140 
Music -0.320*" -0.328*** 
Arts -0.260*" -0.218" 
Communication -0.218" -0.196* 
Architecture -0.040 -0.1011 
Health & Medical Sci. -0.106 -0.132 
Other Majors -0.240*** -0.245*** 
Engineering 0.086 -0.065 
Hispanic -0.058*** -0.053'" -0.052*** -0.053*" 
Black -0.121*** -0.097*** -0.095*** -0.095*** 
Asian -0.036*** -0.080*** -0.087*** -0.088*" 
Native American -0.174*** -0.153*** -0.150*** -0.151*** 
Constant 10.12'" 9.752'" 10.093*** 10.476*** 
R2 0.183 0.224 0.237 0.237 
* : significant at 10 % significance level 
** : significant at 5 % significance level 
***: significant at 1 % significance level 
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Table 6. GRE Score Share of Degrees 
Verbal Score 
BA MA PhD Professional 
Low 
Middle 
High 
33.1% 
62.4% 
4.6% 
31.3% 
61.9% 
6.8% 
20.1% 
70.8% 
9.2% 
5.7% 
90.7% 
3.6% 
Quantitative Score 
BA MA PhD Professional 
Low 
Middle 
High 
19.7% 
45.9% 
34.4% 
28.6% 
42.6% 
28.8% 
24.2% 
47.7% 
28.0% 
25.4% 
63.2% 
11.4% 
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Table 7. Marginal Effect of Individual Ability on Probability 
to Pursue Advanced Degrees 
Dependent Variable Marginal Effect Std. Err. 
BA 0.011 (733020) 
MA 0.035 (637883) 
Ph.D. -0.003 (173405) 
Professional Degree -0.043 (540997) 
Estimates are scaled up by 100,000,000 
Figure L Returns to Schooling Relative to High School Graduates: 1976-1998 
0.8 
Post Oolsge degrees 
0 i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i r 
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
year 
Motes: Values based on coefficients from annual regressions of tog weekly wage on a vector of dummy variables «fating educational 
attainment, age, age squared and a vector of demographic dummy variables. Data taken from the March Current Population Survey (1976-
1998). 
Figure 2. Trends of GRE Verbal and Quantitative Scores., and iTED 12th Grade Score:1963 -1994 
(1963 normalized to 1) 
1.3 
1.25 
1.2 -
0 95 
0.9 -
085 -! 
0.8 
y 
Note: ITED: 12th grade Iowa Test ofEdocs&mal DE \ elopment is taken from Bishop ' 19S9). Beemse the test is taken in the senior year of 
high school, five years is added to match the high school data with the pre urned \ ear the same student would be taking the GRE. 
Figtre 3, Ratio of Foreign Students to Total Doctorate mAcU.S: 1963-1994 
Figure 4. Ratio of F oreign to Total Doctorate Degree Recipients by Major 
1.2 
1.0 
0.6 
04 
Computer Sdertce 
0.0 
1966 1973 1978 1983 1983 
year 
5. Residual Variation of GRE Scores 
1:0.00 
Verbal 
1983 1963 1973 1968 
Year 
Figure 6. Simulated Impact of Average GRE Scores on Earnings by BÂ Cohort 
Quasi GEE Changes 
I 
VhM GEE Ctaiges 
1973 
year 
Figure 7. Simulated Impact of Changes in Distribution of College Majors on Earnings by BA Cohort 
46500 
1983 
year 
48 
1 This increasing trend of college wage premium gets stronger in 1990's. In addition, wage 
premium for higher degrees increases more steeply for last twenty years. See Figure 1, using 
March Current Population Survey, for estimated returns to schooling for college graduates 
and the post college degrees relative to high school graduates between 1976-1998. 
2 In this paper, they argue that, for supply shift, 1970's entry to the labor market of the large 
and relatively well educated baby boom cohorts. However, they mentioned that supply shift 
itself can not explain the trends in earned income inequality. A gradual increase in the 
demand for more skilled workers is also necessary. 
3 The definition or the notion of ability is still arguable. In this paper we use cognitive skills 
as an indicator of ability and use GRE verbal and quantitative test scores as a measure of 
cognitive skill. See Griliches (1977) for more discussion on the notion of ability. 
4 For in depth discussion of ability bias, see Blackburn and Neumark (1993). 
5 The magnitude of the impact of the cognitive skills on wage is about a third of that of years 
of schooling on wages in 1972 and about a half in 1986. 
6 Most studies focus on math and reading skills and use their test scores, some studies use 
more than math and reading tests. For example, Grogger and Fide (1995) used "mosaic" test 
that measures perceptual speed and accuracy. 
7 Paglin and Rufolo (1990) used GRE scores in their wage equation estimates. However their 
wage equation differ from typical earnings functions, so their results are not directly 
comparable to other studies'. Nevertheless, they also found that quantitative scores had a 
larger impact on wages than verbal scores. 
8 See Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) and Grogger and Fide (1995) for example. 
9 Their models are not different in nature. However, Becker's model allows heterogeneous 
individual ability to affect the decision on optimal schooling, so workers of higher ability 
receive higher returns to their human capital. Mincer assumes that workers have same 
opportunity for human capital investment, and so the returns to human capital are also 
identical for all workers. 
10 It also can be shown that Human Capital Earnings function can be derived from economic 
structure. Following Becker (1967), Card (1995) developed an analytically tractable model of 
the decision on optimal schooling and its implications for the earnings function. 
11 To estimate this equation correctly, we need to assume that schooling variable is 
exogenous .  That  i s ,  E(S,u)  = 0 .  
12 We follow the model attributed to Griliches (1977). For more in depth discussion of the 
human capital function and ability bias, see Card (1999). 
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13 See Glewwe (2002) for the in-depth discussion of the relation of the optimal schooling and 
cognitive skills. 
14 GRE also includes standard deviations of GRE scores by major and the ratio of foreign 
graduate students. These variables are prepared to attenuate possible measurement errors in 
GRE scores. This will be discussed in the data section. 
15 Moll (1998) had same results on experience in earnings function using the South Africa 
data. 
16 For example, Murnane et al. (1995) using only math test scores found its positive impact 
on earnings. Blackburn and Neumark (1995), Murnane et al. (2000), and Mitra (2000) using 
both measures of lower education levels of math and verbal abilities found that the sign of 
the estimates of the math coefficients are positive and significant, but the sign of the verbal 
coefficients are either negative or insignificant or both. Grogger and Eide (1995) using 
measures of the high school level of both math and verbal test scores and college major 
dummies found that the sign of the verbal test is negative for male, but positive for female. 
The Sign of math score was positive for both male and female, but it was only significant for 
female. Interesting result of Grogger and Eide is when they estimate earnings function with 
both major dummies and cognitive measures, performances of the test scores decreased. 
17 For this table, we subtracted the lowest score from the highest score and divided it by three 
for each verbal and quantitative score. 
18 The simulation has been done up to 1993 since the scores are available up to that point. 
However the sample means are calculated over 1963 to 1986, which is the sample period. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE ROLE OF MATHEMATICAL AND VERBAL SKILLS ON 
CHOICE OF AND RETURNS TO GRADUATE AND PROFESSIONAL 
EDUCATION 
I. Background 
A wealth of economic research has documented an increase in the returns to 
education in the 1980s. Most of this research has concentrated on the relative returns to a 
bachelor's degree relative to lower levels of education. Since the 1980s, there has been a 
well-documented increase in returns to a college education relative to lower levels of 
schooling. The trend in relative earnings for bachelor's degree holders relative to high 
school graduates between 1976 and 1998 is illustrated in Figure 1. The bachelor's degree 
premium over a high school degree rose from 25% in 1976 to 45% in 1998 with the gains 
beginning in the early 1980s. Not as commonly known is that returns for those who entered 
or completed some post graduate training rose in a parallel fashion through the 1980s, and 
then began to rise even more rapidly than did returns to bachelor's degrees in the 1990s. 
Over the period, the premium earned by those with graduate degrees relative to bachelor's 
degree recipients rose from 32% to 67%. 
This study has two objectives. The first is to measure the returns to post graduate 
training, controlling for likely joint choices of years of schooling and their associated returns. 
The second objective is to determine if the rise in returns to post graduate training can be 
explained by changes in the quality of more recent cohorts of graduate students relative to 
their older colleagues or if we need to seek other explanations for the rising returns to 
graduate education. 
Skill-biased technological change is believed to have progressively raised returns to 
college graduates since the 1970s. Given that graduate training is a heavy user of the 
information technologies believed to be a major source of technological innovations, one 
would expect that technological factors should have had a similar, if not a stronger, impact 
on post-graduate earnings as on bachelor's degree earnings. The rising graduate degree 
premium over the bachelor's degree premium in the 1990s might be a signal that graduate 
training has particularly benefited by skill-biased technical changes, although one might then 
have expected the premium to have risen earlier in the information technology adoption 
process. 
To assess the role of technological change in explaining rising returns to graduate 
training, we focus on the role of quantitative skills on observed returns. Several studies have 
documented changes in the returns to quantitative skills in the 1980s. Murnane, Willett and 
Levy (1995) found that rising returns to mathematics skills can explain a substantial fraction 
of the observed increase in returns to college between 1978 and 1986. The effect was 
stronger for women than for men. Grogger and Eide (1995) and Levine and Zimmerman 
(1995) also reported that standardized mathematics scores or having taken more mathematics 
classes had a significant positive impact on women's wages but not men's wages. 
The mechanism by which mathematical skills influence wages is not clear. It is likely 
that stronger quantitative skills are complementary with the use of information technologies 
that are widely suspected to have raised worker productivity and wages. However, 
quantitative skills may also affect the type of training individuals receive. Willis and Rosen 
(1979), Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995) and Taber (2001) all found that stronger 
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mathematical skills in high school increased the likelihood of attending college. Paglin and 
Rufolo (1990) found that quantitative skills influenced choice of graduate major. 
There is a presumption that quantitative and verbal skills increase in importance as 
the education level rises, and so changes in the value of these skills would be expected to 
affect the market for post-graduate training as well. Our review of the literature that 
concentrated on lower levels of education suggests that two effects are potentially at work: 
1) Rising returns to cognitive skills may have increased the opportunity costs of attending 
graduate school, limiting incentives to pursue post-graduate education in the areas where 
the returns are rising the most rapidly. Consequently, the most able students opt not to 
pursue graduate education in favor of capturing returns to those skills in jobs they can 
acquire with a bachelor's degree. 
2) The marginal product of cognitive skills may have risen atypically in post-graduate t 
raining, raising the returns to graduate training relative to lower education levels. 
These two possibilities would have opposite effects on incentives to attend graduate 
school and on observed wages. The former would suggest that the observed wage 
differentials between graduate and undergraduate degree holders would understate the true 
returns to graduate education because the earnings of those stopping at the bachelor's degree 
exceed the opportunity costs of those who attended graduate school. The latter would 
suggest the most able would attend graduate school, suggesting that the observed wage 
differential between graduate and undergraduate degree holders is an upward biased measure 
of the returns to graduate school. The latter argument would also potentially explain why we 
see rising graduate degree premia in the 1990s relative to earnings at the bachelor's degree 
level. 
Even before we examine why returns to graduate training may have changed, we 
must document the returns to that training. There are many studies that examine incentives 
to enter individual majors and the returns to those decisions. However, more general studies 
of returns to graduate education are rare.1 The main advantage to a general study of returns to 
graduate education for our purposes is that if one of the phenomena we wish to examine is 
how quantitative skills sort individuals across degrees, we need to have the sample cover the 
universe of students and not just a specific field or major. In addition, it is easier to compare 
estimated returns to an education level to the literature on returns to high school or college 
that do not distinguish by field than it is to compare returns to a specific graduate degree in, 
say, law or sociology. 
A frequent challenge for studies measuring returns to schooling is that individuals are 
not randomly assigned to different schooling levels. If schooling choices are driven by 
individual comparative advantage, then the returns will reflect, at least in part, that 
nonrandom sorting of individuals across education levels. A large literature has developed 
assessing the impact on measured returns to schooling of various procedures aimed at 
controlling nonrandom sorting across school levels. A common tactic has been to use 
measures of parental education or other family background measures as instruments for 
education levels. Other instruments have included distance to school or other measures of 
school costs. As reviewed by Card (1999), these studies routinely obtain higher estimated 
returns to schooling when employing instrumental variables than they obtained using 
ordinary least squares. 
However, these instruments are often challenged. For example, commonly used 
family background variables (Willis and Rosen (1979), Altonji and Dunn (1996), Deschenes 
(2002)) may be correlated with unmeasured ability, rendering them invalid.2 Another large 
body of research has utilized data on twins to better control for unmeasured ability. 
Interestingly, results based on twins are similar to the findings reported from instrumental 
variables using family background or school attributes as instruments. While this does not 
validate the use of instrumental variables, it at least suggests that instrumental variables can 
approximate the results obtained from presumably better controls for missing ability. 
Sections II discusses the estimation strategy and III discusses the data. Empirical 
results are reported in Section IV, and Section V reviews the study's conclusions. 
II. Estimation Model 
Our analysis begins with the standard log-earnings framework: 
1  )  In  y ,  =S, f i s  +X t f i x + // ,  p^  + u i ,  
where In yt is the observed earnings of the z'th individual; S-, is the observed schooling level, 
taken as a vector of dummy variables with the value of one indicating the individual's 
highest degree earned; Xj is a vector of individual characteristics; // ,• is an individual-specific 
ability component that influences earnings; and w, is a random error term that is uncorrelated 
with Si, X, and fj,,. The ft s and [i x represent the estimated returns to schooling levels and 
individual attributes, respectively. 
If n ,-is not observable by the econometrician, then (1) becomes 
1' )  Inyj  = Sj  P s + X t  p x  + s i ;  Sj= jUjp^  + u h  
where the error term s, will include both purely random components and unmeasured 
individual ability. If that ability is correlated with schooling success, then exclusion of /z, 
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from the estimating equation will lead to E(S,£,) = E(S, /z, ^  ^ 0, and so the estimates of 
/?.$ and /?*will be subject to missing variables bias. 
In our application, individuals decide between stopping at the bachelor's degree or 
continuing on for additional schooling. The choice set at the time the individual finishes 
undergraduate training includes four schooling levels: Bachelor's, Master's, Doctorate and 
Professional degree (mainly law or medicine). These choices are denoted respectively by 
subscripts B, M, D, and P. For simplicity, we consider these choices mutually exclusive, and 
so we only consider the choice of the highest degree earned. This avoids complications 
related to sequential educational choices. 
The schooling decision involves selecting the option that maximizes utility. This can 
be written as S, =max (SB„ SMI, SPI) where % is the utility from schooling choice /. 
Although the utility levels are not observable, we can observe how the elements of Su affect 
the probability of selecting schooling choice /. 
Suppose that the individual selects schooling level 5, at least in part on the basis of 
expected earnings at that education level. Then the individual will use knowledge of Xt and 
// / to forecast what he expects to earn from each of the four educational choices. Suppose 
also that there is a vector Z, that contains factors that shift the individual's taste for or cost of 
schooling choice /. Then utility from each choice Su can be approximated by 
(2)  S N  = X n  6 X  + Z,  6 Z  + n n  6 f l  + v 0  ;  I  =  B,  M D, P,  
where v/, may include omitted variables, measurement errors, or specification errors of 
functional choice, and it is assumed to be independent of observed variables. 
Now, even if E(S', jun # ) = 0, direct estimation of (1) will yield biased estimates if 
E(vu ui) i- 0. This endogeneity bias is caused by the joint selection of years of schooling 
with the expected returns from that schooling. A large literature on returns to schooling 
suggests that both sources of bias, missing measures of ability and endogeneity of the 
schooling choice, are likely to hold, although the biases are often small. However, we cannot 
infer from the past literature that there would be small biases in the context of estimated 
returns to post graduate education. Consequently, we need to derive a mechanism to address 
the two potential sources of bias. 
To solve the problem, we follow two strategies commonly employed in the literature. 
First, we use graduate school tuition, medical school tuition, and the proportion of self-
supporting graduate students in the year of receipt of the bachelor's degree as measures of 
the anticipated cost of attending graduate or professional education. These measures are 
included as elements of Z, that are believed to alter the probability of continuing in school but 
do not affect what individuals expect to earn after completing school. 
We also included measures of parental education as elements of Z,. Card (1999) 
argued that parental education might not be a legitimate instrument for years of schooling 
because parental education is correlated with unobserved individual ability, even if parental 
education does not directly affect earnings. His argument suggested that when parental 
education is used as an instrument for years of schooling, the estimated returns would be 
biased upward. We also estimated equation systems that included parental education as 
elements of Xt that enter both the schooling and earnings equations. Those estimates showed 
that estimated returns were even larger when parental education was used as an instrument, 
although the differences were not large. In our application, use of parental education as an 
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instrument for years of schooling does not appear to bias the coefficients upward. We report 
the estimates that exclude parental education from Xt. The other estimates are available on 
request. 
One reason our measures of parental education appear not to cause problems may be 
that we are able to incorporate measures of verbal and quantitative ability into equations (1) 
and (2) that are typically missing in other studies. Let individual ability be given by 
(3) Mu=M? +Vi 
where //" is the vector of average mathematical and verbal skills associated with the 
individual's undergraduate major and 77,is an individual-specific ability component that does 
not vary in productivity across schooling levels. The 77 -, would not affect choice of schooling 
level. However, verbal and mathematical skills can have different productivities at different 
schooling levels. Variation in //,M across majors at one point in time or across cohorts can 
affect the graduate school entry decision. Elements of Z, can still serve as legitimate 
instruments for years of schooling provided that E(Z, rj,) = 0. 
Inserting equation (3) into equation (2), we obtain 
(4) Su = Xi,Qx +Zi,0z + ( jif +77 j)0M +vn, 
=  r z „  x " ;  +  c ,  ;  + z „ e z +  C  =  ? / ,  +  ^ ,  
l = B, M, D, P. 
Therefore an individual chooses an alternative / over B if /,* > 0 where 
(5) . 
The probability of an individual to choose a schooling level I over B is 
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(6) Pr[/,: >0] = Pr[g(^„Z„^)-^ ^ 0] 
= Pr[%<g(^,„Z,,,/^)]. 
If the coti are drawn independently from an extreme value distribution, then (4) can be 
estimated using multinomial logit. The parameter estimates will generate predicted 
probabilities that individual i will select any of the four options SMl, Sot, and SPl. Three of 
these are inserted into (1) in place of the endogenous St to generate unbiased estimates of 
under the maintained hypothesis that E(Z, v/,) = E(Z, rj,) = 0. 
This two-step procedure is inefficient because it does not incorporate the sampling 
errors in the parameter estimation of the multinomial logit estimates of (4) into the estimation 
of the log earnings equation (1). We correct the second-stage standard errors using a 
bootstrapping procedure in which the two-step estimation was replicated 100 times, sampling 
with replacement, and sampling variation in the resulting estimates used to compute the 
second-stage standard errors. 
If major-specific skills at the bachelor's degree level are increasing in market value, 
then they will tend to lower incentives to pursue graduate work in that field. Conversely, 
majors whose skills are falling in value at the bachelor's level will have disproportionately 
high numbers of graduate students. If this sorting effect drives lower earning bachelor's 
degree recipients into graduate school and drives higher earning bachelor's degree recipients 
out of graduate school, it would tend to depress estimated returns to graduate work. If true, 
then least squares estimates of the returns to graduate school that ignored the role of major-
specific ability measures would tend to understate the true returns. Our empirical work 
provides evidence consistent with this sorting story. 
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HI. Data 
The primary data source for this study is the Scientist and Engineer Statistics Data 
System (SESTAT) collected by the National Science Foundation (NSF). The 1993 wave of 
SESTAT also incorporated the 1993 National Survey of College Graduates, a once-per-
decade survey that also covered fields outside of the sciences and engineering. The universe 
for the 1993 SESTAT was approximately 29 million individuals who received a bachelor's 
degree between 1939 and 1992. Our working sample included 67,565 individuals who 
received a bachelor's degree between 1963 and 1986. The 1963 limit was necessitated by the 
lack of information on Graduate Records Exam (GRE) scores by major before 1963. The 
1986 limit was imposed because we needed to give bachelor's degree recipients sufficient 
time to enter and complete higher degrees. Through the use of sample weights, our 
subsample is representative of the population of all bachelor's degree recipients in the United 
States between 1963 and 1986. 
Table 1 includes summary statistics on the variables included in the analysis. The 
dependent variables include the natural logarithm of annual salary in 1993 and a series of 
dummy variables indicating highest degree earned. Earnings of all college graduates in 1993 
averaged just under $54,000. Bachelor's recipients averaged $48,000 while Master's 
recipients averaged $53,000, Ph.D.s averaged $60,000 and those with professional degrees 
averaged $84,000. Fifty-five percent of the college graduate population did not earn a degree 
beyond the bachelor's level. Twenty-nine percent had a Master's degree, 10 percent held 
professional degrees, and 6 percent had doctorates. 
Variables included in the demographic vector Xt are potential work experience (1993 
- graduation year of highest degree), gender, citizenship, and racial and ethnic dummy 
variables. The vector Zz includes average real medical school and graduate school tuition, 
and the percentage of self-supporting graduate students for the year the individual received 
the first undergraduate diploma. Data on tuition and availability of graduate support were 
collected from the National Center for Education Statistics. Higher tuition levels should 
lower the probability of pursuing a graduate or professional degree. The percentage of 
graduate students who are self-supporting indicates a lower probability of obtaining a 
graduate assistantship or fellowship at the time the individual received the bachelor's degree. 
We also included information on whether the individual was raised in a rural area and the 
education levels of the individual's parents as reported in SESTAT. These measures are 
presumed to proxy tastes for graduate education: individuals from more educated households 
or from more cosmopolitan settings are expected to have stronger taste for graduate training. 
Measures ofXn include a vector of dummy variables indicating bachelor's degree 
major. We also know the year of graduation. This allows us to append information on the 
average GRE mathematics and verbal score for the college major in the year of graduation.3 
The GRE scores are used to approximate the skill content of the major. These measures are 
not fixed over time, as can be seen in Figure 2. Average verbal scores rose until 1975 and 
then fell thereafter. Average quantitative scores rose about 12 percent until 1975, retreated 
slightly over the next ten years, and then resumed modest growth. 
These changes may reflect changes in the composition of foreign graduate students 
taking the GRE. We computed the proportion of foreign doctorate recipients by major for 
each year in the sample period, using data from the Survey of Earned Doctorates. We then 
regressed the GRE scores by major on the proportion of foreign doctoral graduates in the 
major six year earlier.4 The residual represents changes in the skill content of college 
graduates holding fixed the proportion of foreign test takers. These corrected GRE time 
paths are also shown in Figure 2. The corrected verbal GRE path is very similar to the 
uncorrected path. However, the corrected quantitative GRE path shows a much steeper 
decline in average scores after 1975 and a much steeper rebound after 1986.5 The time series 
of average GRE scores does not demonstrate a systematic improvement in the quality of 
GRE test takers over time, suggesting that rising quality of graduate degree holders is not the 
explanation for the pattern of rising returns to graduate school in Figure 1. 
The GRE scores also varied across majors, genders, races, and education levels. This 
variation provides cross-sectional variation in the skill content of bachelor's degree 
recipients. As shown in Table 2, students whose highest degrees were at the bachelor's level 
were in majors with the highest quantitative scores and the lowest verbal scores. This is 
consistent with the speculation that the sorting into graduate school may be based in part on 
cognitive skill content of majors as proxied by GRE scores. Undergraduate majors in the 
sciences and engineering had markedly higher average quantitative scores while Engineering 
and Business had markedly lower average verbal scores. If returns to these skills have 
changed over time, there will be asymmetric changes in the relative incentives to seek post­
graduate training across majors. Because demographic groups concentrate in different 
majors, there is cross-sectional variation in major GRE scores by race, ethnicity and gender. 
Men tended to be in majors with higher average quantitative GREs and marginally lower 
verbal GREs. Asians also concentrate in majors with high quantitative and low verbal 
scores. 
Together, the time series and cross-sectional variation in GRE scores should be 
sufficiently large to assess whether changes in cognitive skills developed in undergraduate 
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programs have a role in explaining changes in the returns to post-graduate education in the 
United States. We proceed to that exercise in the next section. 
IV. Estimation Results 
A. Schooling Choices 
Our primary interest is in deriving estimates of equation (1), but we also have an 
interest in assessing how bachelor degree recipients decide to continue on in school. Results 
from the weighted multinomial logit estimation of the schooling choice equation are reported 
in Table 3. The estimation uses stopping education at the bachelor's degree as the reference 
group, and so positive (negative) signs suggest an increased (decreased) probability of the 
educational choice relative to stopping at the B.A. level. 
Family background variables are highly significant in influencing the choice of 
whether or not to pursue and advanced degree. As mother's and father's education levels rise, 
the probability of seeking an advanced degree increases. The effect is strongest at the PhD 
level. B.A. recipients who grew up in rural areas are less likely to pursue an advanced degree. 
U.S. citizens are less likely to seek a Master's or doctorate but are more likely to pursue a 
professional degree. Asians are more likely than whites to pursue a Master's or Ph.D., while 
Hispanics and Blacks are less likely to pursue the doctorate. 
Measures of expected cost of pursuing a graduate degree performed as expected. 
Individuals who received the bachelor's degree in years with higher real graduate and 
medical school tuition levels were less likely to pursue an advanced degree. However, the 
negative effect is only statistically significant for the effect of graduate school tuition on PhD 
or Professional degrees. The percentage of self-supporting graduate students also 
significantly decreased the probability of pursuing an advanced degree. We also interacted 
the probability of self-support with a measure of parental education with the expectation that 
parents with higher education levels might moderate the adverse effects of a low probability 
of receiving graduate support.6 That expectation was also realized in that all signs on the 
interacted terms were positive, although only significant in predicting the likelihood of 
obtaining a Master's degree. 
GRE scores have an interesting impact on the probability of pursuing a higher degree. 
Undergraduates in majors with higher verbal scores and lower quantitative scores are more 
likely to pursue the doctorate or professional degrees. The standard deviation of GRE scores 
in the major tend to reinforce the effects of the mean scores: higher standard deviation of 
GRE verbal scores raises the likelihood of pursuing the doctorate, while increasing the 
standard deviation of the quantitative score lowers the likelihood of pursuing the doctorate. 
In separate regressions, we found that the impact of the quantitative score on schooling 
choice has not changed over time. If returns to quantitative skills have risen over time, the 
impacts must have been neutral across education levels. The GRE verbal score may have 
gained modestly in importance over time, but the effect is much smaller than the quantitative 
score. 
Our main results concerning the impact of changing cognitive skills on graduate 
school choice are illustrated in Figures 3-5, using the results from Table 3. The simulations 
are carried through to 1993 because all necessary information was available, although the 
parameter estimates are based on data just through 1986. The most dramatic changes are due 
to changes in the GRE quantitative score. As shown in Figure 3, the proportion of students 
stopping at the bachelor's degree has risen since the mid 1980s while the likelihood of 
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seeking doctoral or professional degrees has fallen due to rising average quantitative GRE 
scores. The finding that the marginal impact of the GRE quantitative score does not vary 
across graduation cohorts suggests that this is a result of rising quantitative skills and not 
rising returns to those skills. 
Because verbal scores raise the likelihood of seeking advanced degrees, rising GRE 
verbal scores in the 1960s and 1970s tended to increase the likelihood of entering graduate 
school. However, the erosion in verbal skills indicated by the steady decline in average GRE 
verbal scores since 1975 have tended to reverse that effect. By 1993, most of the increase in 
predicted probability of seeking advanced degrees associated with verbal skills had 
disappeared. 
Putting the two effects together, we show in Figure 5 that changes in quantitative 
skills increased the probability of seeking a doctorate until 1978 and then the probability 
began a slow, steady decline. The probability of stopping at the bachelor's degree level 
began to rise in the mid 1980s at the same time as the probability of seeking a professional 
degree began to fall. The net impact of changing verbal and quantitative skills of bachelor's 
degree cohorts has been to lower the supply of doctorates since the late 70s and to lower the 
supply of professionals since the mid 80s. 
B. Estimated Returns to Post Graduate Education 
Table 4 reports the results from Ordinary Least Squares and Two-stage estimation of 
the log earnings equation (1). Both sets of results correct for sample weights. Least squares 
estimates of returns to graduate education are positive and significant. However, the implied 
annual returns are small. Assuming a Master's program takes two years and a PhD program 
takes 6, implied annual returns are only 5.8% and 4.2% respectively.7 Annualized returns to 
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professional degrees are more reasonable at 14.1%, assuming a four year program. There is a 
significant positive return to GRE mathematics scores, but no measurable return to verbal 
skills. There is a significant premium for postgraduate degrees in business and a significant 
discount for postgraduate degrees in the sciences. 
Controlling for the likely endogeneity of the schooling choices raises the measured 
returns to advanced degrees.8 The implied annual return to a Master's degree rises to 14.5%, 
and the returns to a Ph.D. rises to 12.6%, very similar to instrumental variable estimates of 
the returns to a year of education obtained at lower levels of education. The annualized 
return to a professional degree rises to 20.9%.* 
Returning to the two alternative possibilities discussed at the beginning of the paper, 
our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that students who would be atypically 
successful in graduate school are actually more likely to halt their education at the bachelor's 
level. Consequently, average earnings of bachelor's degree recipients overstate the 
opportunity cost faced by those opting to pursue advanced degrees. 
Our assessment is that the sorting is most easily observed when examining the role of 
the average GRE quantitative score. As indicated before, higher average GRE quantitative 
scores actually lower the probability of pursuing graduate education, even though strong 
quantitative skills are presumed to increase the likelihood of success in graduate school. 
Consequently, atypically strong graduate school prospects are actually less likely to pursue 
graduate training. 
We can illustrate the impact of changing GRE scores on observed returns to 
schooling. We simulate how GRE scores alter log earnings directly and indirectly through 
their implied impact on the probability of receiving an advanced degree illustrated earlier in 
Figure 5. The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 6. The direct effect of increases 
in the GRE quantitative score is to raise earnings, although the coefficient is no longer 
precisely estimated. There was little direct effect of the verbal score on earnings. The rise in 
average GRE scores also lowers the likelihood of attending graduate school, which 
counteracts the positive direct returns to quantitative scores. 
The GRE verbal score does have an impact on earnings through its influence on post 
graduate training. However, when GRE scores start to slide, the resulting earnings retreat to 
just 2% above their 1963 level. The summed effects of the changes in GRE scores is a 
modest increase in average earnings across all college graduates, suggesting that changing 
skill content of bachelor's degree cohorts can only explain about 2% of the 35% increase in 
relative earnings for graduate degree holders shown in Figure 1. 
These are the average earnings effects, but they can be used to motivate the 
hypothesized sorting effect discussed above. Those who do not go on to graduate school are 
drawn atypically from the upper tail of the GRE quantitative distribution and the lower tail of 
the GRE verbal distribution, both of which are expected to raise their earnings. On the other 
hand, those who go on to graduate school are drawn disproportionately from the lower tail of 
the quantitative GRE distribution and from the upper tail of the GRE verbal distribution, both 
of which lower their opportunity costs of graduate school. Consequently, the observed 
premium of average earnings for post graduate degree holders over bachelor's degree 
recipients understates the true returns to graduate school. Correcting for the sorting raises the 
estimated returns, as found in Table 4. 
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C. Unobserved Ability 
Unobserved individual abilities may also affect the likelihood of pursuing an 
advanced degree. To test that hypothesis, we follow Rosenweig and Schultz (1983) by 
collecting the residuals from the earnings equation. These residuals represent individual 
ability uncorrelated with education level, major level skills, parents' education level, or 
demographic variables included in the model. They will also include random noise in the 
earnings function, so they will measure the unobserved ability with error. An auxiliary 
multinomial logit estimation of education choices on the earnings residuals will illustrate the 
direction of the effect of unobserved ability to earn income on the probability of seeking 
graduate or professional education. Note that the measurement error inherent in this method 
will tend to bias the coefficients toward zero. 
Table 5 reports the estimated marginal effect of the earnings residual on the 
probability of pursuing each degree. Those with higher unobserved ability to earn income 
were less likely to stop at the bachelor's degree level and were more likely to pursue 
advanced degrees of all types. Consequently, sorting on unobserved ability works in the 
opposite direction as sorting on observed quantitative skills. 
V. Conclusions 
Returns to advanced degrees are positive and significant. Least squares estimates are 
quite low, on the order of 5% per year. Estimates increase in magnitude after controlling for 
likely endogeneity of the choice of pursuing an advanced degree, with estimated returns of 
comparable size to those estimated for schooling more generally. The findings of downward 
bias in least squares estimates of returns to graduate education are similar to findings in other 
settings. 
Our study points out an interesting role for cognitive skills in the market for advanced 
degrees. Students in majors with higher average quantitative GRE scores are less likely to 
attend graduate school, even though such students presumably are more likely to be 
successful in graduate education. The opposite happens for verbal skills—students in majors 
with higher average verbal GRE scores are more likely to attend graduate school. This leads 
to a sorting effect whereby students whose cognitive skills would suggest lower earnings at 
the bachelor's level are more likely to attend graduate school. This sorting effect appears to 
be part of the cause of the downward bias in estimated returns to graduate education—the 
average earnings of those who do not go to graduate school overstate the opportunity costs of 
graduate education for those who do pursue advanced degrees. Nevertheless, changes in 
verbal and quantitative skills over time do not explain the large increases in relative returns 
to graduate and professional education since 1980. Future work is needed to identify the 
source of those rising returns. 
These conclusions are subject to the usual caveat that our instruments may not be 
valid, although our measures of the costs of graduate education perform as expected, and we 
do try to control for unmeasured ability to a greater extent than has been possible in most 
studies. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that to the extent that remaining unmeasured 
ability is important and correlated with our measures of family background variables, our 
results may still be subject to biases that we cannot control with the data at hand. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: 1963-1986 (N = 67565) 
Variable Mean Std. Err. 
Demographics Age ' 41.2 (0.027) 
Experience 17.4 (0.025) 
Male 0.723 (0.002) 
US Citizen 0.956 (0.001) 
Rural Background 0.319 (0.002) 
Education BA 0.549 (0.002) 
MA 0.287 (0.002) 
Ph. D. 0.063 (0.001) 
Prof. Degree 0.101 (0.001) 
Posdoc 0.004 (>0.001) 
Race Hispanic 0.031 (0.001) 
White 0.849 (0.001) 
Black 0.052 (0.001) 
Asian 0.066 (0.001) 
Native Am. 0.002 (>0.001) 
BA Major Field Science Majors 0.342 (0.002) 
Engineering Majors 0.205 (0.002) 
Social Sci. Majors 0.326 (0.002) 
Business Major 0.032 (0.001) 
Other Majors 0.095 (0.001) 
Earnings (1993 dollar) Overall 53,864 (113.319) 
BA 47,900 (161.490) 
MA 53,325 (208.694) 
Ph.D. 59,657 (165.362) 
Professional Degree 84,155 (727.269) 
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Table 1. (cont'd) 
Parents Education Mother Ed 11 - 0.154 (0.001) 
Mother Ed 12 0.398 (0.002) 
Mother Ed 12 - 15 0.211 (0.002) 
Mother Ed 16 0.151 (0.001) 
Mother Ed 17 + 0.086 (0.001) 
Father Ed 11 - 0.189 (0.002) 
Father Ed 12 0.268 (0.002) 
Father Ed 12-15 0.181 (0.001) 
Father Ed 16 0.176 (0.001) 
Father Ed 17 + 0.185 (0.001) 
Med. School Tuition (1993 10,651 (10.324) 
dollar) 
Grad. School Tuition (1993 3,501 (1.052) 
dollar) 
% Self-Supported 26.3% (0.020) 
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Table 2: Average GRE Score for the major, by attributes of individuals in the major 
Individual Attribute Verbal GRE Quantitative GRE 
BA 500.8 581.9 
MA 502.4 568.7 
PhD 508.2 573.0 
Professional Degree 515.4 555.7 
Science Majors 512.0 606.0 
Engineering Majors 469.2 649.5 
Social Science Majors 518.6 518.5 
Business Major 475.4 542.3 
Other Majors 502.4 507.5 
White 503.6 573.9 
Black 504.9 553.2 
Asian 497.1 604.0 
Native American 506.9 563.2 
Male 501.0 585.3 
Female 509.0 547.8 
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Table 3. Multinomial Logit Estimation of Higher Education Choices 
Variable MA PhD Professional 
Mother Ed 11- 0.113 (0.046) 0.196 (0.054) -0.106 (0.095) 
Mother Ed 12 - 15 0.045 (0.042) 0.214 (0.047) 0.178 (0.070) 
Mother Ed 16 -0.228 (0.118) 0.152 (0.118) 0.123 (0.177) 
Mother Ed 17 + -0.041 (0.127) 0.641 (0.123) 0.352 (0.184) 
Father Ed 11- -0.068 (0.047) -0.149 (0.055) -0.293 (0.092) 
Father Ed 12 - 15 -0.012 (0.046) 0.013 (0.053) 0.092 (0.081) 
Father Ed 16 -0.195 (0.117) 0.059 (0.115) 0.149 (0.179) 
Father Ed 17 + 0.133 (0.119) 0.615 (0.118) 0.782 (0.178) 
Experience/100 0.317 (5.316) 0.237 (5.442) 7.178 (8.429) 
Experience squared/100 0.018 (0.120) 0.071 (0.125) -0.331 (0.192) 
Verbal mean/100 0.319 (0.099) 1.343 (0.104) 1.923 (0.145) 
Quant. Mean/100 0.049 (0.056) -0.494 (0.052) -1.565 (0.092) 
Verbal stdv/100 0.228 (0.038) 0.114 (0.040) -0.307 (0.074) 
Quant. Stdv/100 -0.202 (0.034) -0.109 (0.037) 0.266 (0.065) 
Foreign Student Ratio/100 -50.84 (15.86) 156.2 (12.21) 169.2 (17.76) 
Science Majors -0.890 (0.078) -0.098 (0.085) 2.495 (0.187) 
Engineering Majors -0.620 (0.103) -0.451 (0.117) 1.640 (0.267) 
Social science Majors -0.726 (0.065) -0.952 (0.077) 1.160 (0.165) 
Business Major -0.628 (0.099) -1.529 (0.179) -1.085 (0.557) 
Rural background -0.180 (0.032) -0.231 (0.035) -0.396 (0.057) 
Male -0.230 (0.035) 0.343 (0.041) 0.664 (0.060) 
Citizen -0.389 (0.056) -1.544 (0.060) 0.338 (0.117) 
Hispanic -0.042 (0.057) -0.292 (0.084) 0.072 (0.088) 
Black -0.040 (0.050) -0.330 (0.090) -0.162 (0.087) 
Asian 0.238 (0.043) 0.394 (0.050) -0.069 (0.079) 
Native Am. 0.111 (0.153) 0.256 (0.170) -0.549 (0.276) 
Medical School Tuition/100 -0.007 (0.005) -0.003 (0.006) -0.003 (0.009) 
Graduate School Tuition/100 -0.010 (0.023) -0.100 (0.025) -0.065 (0.038) 
% Self-Supported -0.028 (0.010) -0.035 (0.010) -0.041 (0.016) 
Parent Ed 16+*% Self-Supported 0.021 (0.001) 0.006 (0.008) 0.010 (0.012) 
Constant 0.012 (0.763) -1.902 (0.823) -2.928 (1.190) 
Pseudo R2 = 0.082 
Standard errors in parentheses. Tuition is in constant 1983-84 dollars. 
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Table 4: Ordinary Least Squares and Two-Stage Estimation of the Log Earnings 
Function 
Equation 
Variables 
OLS Estimates 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
IV Estimates 
Coefficient Std. Err. 
MA 
PhD 
Professional Degree 
0.115 (0.007) 
0.249 (0.008) 
0.565 (0.013) 
0.289 (0.158) 
0.756 (0.109) 
0.837 (0.085) 
Experience/100 
Experience Squared/100 
3.189 (0.286) 
-0.039 (0.008) 
3.058 (10.04) 
-0.044 (0.027) 
Male/100 
Citizen/100 
Posdoc/100 
16.695 (0.738) 
10.448 (1.256) 
-36.757 (1.105) 
15.592 (0.023) 
16.872 (0.011) 
-26.589 (0.010) 
Verbal mean/100 
Quant, mean/100 
Verbal stdv/100 
Quant. Stdv/100 
Foreign Student Ratio/100 
-0.072 (0.020) 
0.186 (0.012) 
0.030 (0.007) 
-0.026 (0.007) 
-4.692 (2.846) 
-0.154 (0.331) 
0.230 (1.515) 
0.024 (0.009) 
-0.020 (2.019) 
-12.08 (1.095) 
Science Majors 
Engineering Majors 
Social Science Majors 
Business Major 
-0.066 (0.016) 
0.001 (0.021) 
0.015 (0.013) 
0.100 (0.019) 
-0.084 (0.011) 
-0.012 (0.009) 
0.042 (0.011) 
0.135 (0.034) 
Hispanic 
Black 
Asian 
Native Am. 
-0.053 (0.011) 
-0.094 (0.009) 
-0.081 (0.009) 
-0.150 (0.034) 
-0.042 (0.051) 
-0.078 (0.051) 
-0.098 (0.046) 
-0.141 (0.032) 
Constant 9.342 (0.087) 9.394 (0.029) 
R2 0.228 0.139 
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Table 5. Marginal Effect of Individual Heterogeneity on 
Probability to Pursue Advanced Degree 
Dependent Variable Marginal Effect Std. Err. 
BA -0.224 (0.007) 
MA 0.029 (0.007) 
Ph.D. 0.038 (0.002) 
Professional Degree 0.157 (0.004) 
Fipire 1. Estimated Returns to Schooling Relative to High School Graduates: 1976-1998 
Post Graduate eâticatiofi 
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 
Ye* 
Notes: Values based on coefficients from auaai régressions of leg weetiy wage on a vector of dummy variables indtca&ig 
educational attairaneut, age, age squared, and a vector of demographic dummy variables. Data taken firoe the Mardi Cuoeat 
Population Survey (1975-199S). 
Figure 2; Trends of Observed and Corrected GRE Verbal and Qoanlàative Scores, 
1963-1997 
Quantitative Score 
540 
cted Quantitative Score 
j^LCorrected Verbal Scoi » 
Yme 
Note: Corrected Scores remove the estiaated effect of foreign test takers from the mean, score. Data taken from the 
Educational Testais Service and the Snrvev of Earned Doctorates, various vears. 
79 
Figure 3: Simulated Probability of Schooling Choices from Changes in the 
Quantitative GRE Score, all else equal 
(1963 normalized to 1) 
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Figure 4: Simulated Probability of Schooling Choices from Changes 
in the Verbal GRE Score, all else equal 
(1963 normalized to 1) 
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Figure 5: Simulated Probability of Schooling Choices from Changes in 
both the Quantitative and Verbal GRE Scores, all else equal 
(1963 normalized to 1) 
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Figure 6: Simulated Direct and Indirect Impact of Changes in GRE Scores 
on the Average Earnings of Bachelor's Degree Recipients, 1963-1993 
(in 1993 dollars) 
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1 See Ehrenberg (1992) for a review. The most recent study of which we are aware is Jaeger 
and Page (1996). Earlier studies include Ashenfelter and Mooney (1968) and Taubman and 
Wales (1973). There is a vast literature on incentives to enter and returns to specific graduate 
degrees, pioneered by Richard Freeman (1976 a, b; 1999). 
2 In their study of twins data, Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) found that family background 
variables strongly affected educational choices but did not affect earnings, exactly what one 
would want in an instrument. However, as Card (1999) argues, even that is not sufficient to 
validate family background measures as instruments if family background is correlated with 
unobservable ability. 
3 The Educational Testing Service provided this data for selected years: 1963, 1974 to 1976, 
1983 to 1986. The number of majors included in the report varied from 21 majors in 1963 ; 92 
majors in 1974 - 76; and 98 majors in 1983 - 86. These were aggregated into 28 major 
groups to correspond with the majors reported in the SESTAT. The GRE did not report data 
on 9 of the majors 1963, and so the nearest included major was used: e.g. computer science 
was placed in mathematics; agricultural and food science was placed in biology; and so on. 
Once consistent data series were generated for the four reporting dates, the values were 
interpolated to generate continuous values for the intervening years. As most average scores 
change very slowly, this process is unlikely to generate wildly inaccurate estimates of 
average scores by major. 
4 We presume that the average doctoral program takes six years and that the percentage of 
foreign graduates completing the program is proportional to the percentage taking the GRE 
exam six years earlier. 
5 Bishop (1989) traced the time path of 12th grade high school cognitive skills. Our GRE 
scores would lag his measures by four years. The timing of the decline in verbal and 
quantitative scores is roughly consistent with the pattern of scores he reported for the Iowa 
Test of Basic Skills. 
6 Parents education level variable is 1 if both parents are more than college graduate, lA if 
either one of them is more than college graduate, and 0 if both are less than college graduate. 
7 Jaeger and Page (1996) also estimate similarly small returns to Master's and PhD degrees 
under the assumption of exogenous education levels. Their estimation method includes both 
years of schooling as well as dummy variables indicating degree, so our annualized results 
are not directly comparable to theirs. 
8 Estimates that also included parental education in the second-stage earnings functions 
yielded comparable estimates of returns to graduate and professional education. 
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9 These are likely to be overstated in that we do not incorporate tuition costs into the 
estimated return to professional degrees, and so these returns are gross of tuition costs. In 
contrast, tuition is often waived in doctoral programs, so those estimates are presumably 
closer to the true net return. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE COMPUTER AND THE INTERNET TECHNOLOGY 
ADOPTION AND THE URBAN-RURAL DIGITAL DIVIDE: 
DOES HIGH SPEED INTERNET ACCESS MATTER? 
I. Background 
There is widespread agreement that information technologies (IT) have contributed to 
U.S. economic growth since the mid 1990's. Jorgensen (2001) argued that productivity 
growth in IT-producing industries, especially in the semiconductor industry, led to 
substantial price declines in IT equipment. This IT cost decline has been a key element in the 
unprecedented economic expansion of the 1990s. Litan and Rivlin (2001) argued that IT 
technologies have effects beyond cost saving. IT can raise firm growth by improving 
customer service and by raising managerial efficiencies through enhanced supply-chain 
management. Blinder (2000) also concluded that IT accelerated the productivity growth of 
the U.S. 
The rapid development of information technologies is also believed to be a factor 
explaining increasing U.S. wage inequality. Economists and commentators argue that the 
new information technologies are skill-biased, raising relative demand for highly educated 
workers relative to lower skilled workers (Acemoglu (2001), Autor, Katz and Kruger (1998)). 
To the extent that access to these technologies differs across races, genders, or regions, IT 
threatens to broaden earnings gaps. Differences in IT technology adoption and/or use 
between races, education levels, and regions has been labeled the "Digital Divide." 
Previous studies have documented differences in adoption rates between the sexes, 
races, and education levels. However, most of these groups have similar access to 
technologies. In contrast, there can be large differences in access to technologies between 
urban and rural areas. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
(NTIA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce (2000) reported that, from 1998 to 2000, Black 
and Hispanic households have Internet adoption rates that are roughly half that of White and 
Asian households. There is only a modest gap in Internet use between men and women, 
Households in urban areas or in central cities have higher Internet access rates than 
households in rural area, although the rate of rural households is increasing faster than the 
other two areas. There are also significant differences in Internet and computer utilization 
rates by income and education level. 
Prieger (2003) studied the supply-side of the Digital Divide. He investigated how 
various factors such as rural location, income, and race etc. affect broadband availability in a 
zipcode using the FCC, Census, and a telecommunications wire center database. He found no 
statistically significant differences in access to high speed Internet service by income. He 
also found no significant differences in access by ethnic or racial groups with the exception 
that Native Americans were significantly less likely to receive service. However, he did find 
rural location and demand side characteristics such as age, education or sex profiles of 
population in a zipcode are important determinants of broadband availability. 
Fairlie (2004) analyzed the demand side of the Digital Divide. Using data from the 
Computer and Internet Use Supplement to the August 2000 Current Population Survey, he 
investigated the racial differences in rates of computer and Internet adoption. He explored the 
gap in utilization across races. He found that education, income and occupation are 
important determinants of computer ownership and having Internet access at home and that 
those factors also explain a substantial portion of racial gap, too. He speculated that there 
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might be price or accessibility differences between rural and urban areas from the finding 
that living in a rural area had a negative effect on Internet access at home. 
Gabe and Abel (2002) found that major telecommunications carriers deploy more 
ISDN (a high-speed, digital communications technology) infrastructure in metropolitan areas 
than in non-metropolitan areas in the U.S. and that the metro-nonmetro gap seems to be 
widening. 
Past research suggests two possible reasons for an urban-rural digital divide. One is 
differences on the demand side such, as education, income or ethnicity that differ across 
regions that would lead to differences in technology adoption. The other is differences on the 
supply side, specifically differences in technology access across regions. Previous work that 
analyzes the demand side or the supply side separately may lead to misleading inferences if, 
for example, the same factor such as income is correlated with both use and availability of 
the technology. This study will investigate how both supply-side and demand-side factors 
affect adoption. Policy implications can be different depending on which factor is more 
crucial to the problem. 
We explore two interrelated questions. 
1) To what extent is there a difference in technology access and utilization between rural 
and urban areas? 
2) How much of the difference in utilization is explained by differential technology 
access and how much is due to other socioeconomic factors? 
We explore five measures of IT use on the job: use of the Internet at home for work; 
use of a computer at home for work: use of the Internet at work; use of a computer at work; 
Internet use for any purposes. The first two are viewed as measures of telecommuting, while 
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the third and the fourth require physical commuting to access the technology. We investigate 
how local IT access, as measured by the number of high speed Internet providers in the 
county, affects the likelihood of adopting any of these five technology uses. 
In section II, we discuss the empirical model of information technology adoption 
decision. Section III discusses data set used in this paper. The estimation model for the IT 
adoption decision and its results are included in section IV. Section V includes summary and 
conclusion. 
II. Empirical Model 
In our application, individuals decide whether or not to use technologies, namely the 
Internet or computers. The decision involves selecting the option that maximizes expected 
utility. We define that the utility function of an individual i is 
1) 
where Xy denote the observed characteristics of the individual, /y is a dummy variable that 
indicates if an individual i chooses to use technology j, the vector Z, is a vector of variables 
that shifts the individual's taste for or cost of computer or Internet uses, and ei} is an 
unobserved random component. Although the utility level is not observable, we can specify 
a functional form for a representative agent into two components 
2 ) C /  =  r ( / , ; ^ , Z , )  +  f * .  
Individual / is assumed to choose to use the new technology, /y = 1, if 
3) F(/,=l;^,Z;) + ^^(^=0;%;,Z;) + g;,or 
4 ) / ; = g ( ^ , z , ) - ^ > o ,  
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where g(JQ = [V(Itj = 1 ; Xip Zy) - F(/y = 0; Zy)], 77. = -f,', and /* is the latent 
variable of an individual i to choose to accept the new technology j. By approximating (4) 
into a linear form, we get 
5) /* =XtJ Pj +Zy Pj -Tji, where /y = 1 if I* >0 and 0 otherwise. 
Therefore, the probability for an individual i to choose to use technology j is 
6)Pr[4=l] = Pr[g(%,,Z,)-^>0] 
= Pr[7 .  < g(Xy,Z. )]. 
If the rjij is assumed to be randomly and normally distributed, equation (5) can be estimated 
using probit. 
III. Description of the Data Set 
The data set analyzed in this paper is collected from three sources. The main 
individual information is taken from a survey conducted by the UCLA Center for 
Communication Policy (CCP) from 1999 to 2001. The survey is representative of the United 
States population. Each year, the survey covered about 2,000 people. The survey also 
included information on the respondent's zip code, which allowed us to merge in Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) data on the number of high speed Internet access 
providers by zip code. The zip code also allowed us to identify the county of residence. That 
enabled us to merge in USDA Economic Research Service data on Rural-Urban Continuum 
(Beale) codes that identify counties as rural urban or metropolitan. We used only the 1999 
and 2001 waves of the UCLA CCP surveys. The 2000 CCP could not be used because it 
lacked the zip code information needed to merge zip code- or county-level information. The 
survey questions include the individual's employment status, education level, demographic 
characteristics, and attitudes regarding Internet or computer use. The FCC has reported the 
number of high speed Internet providers at the zip code level every six months since 
December 1999. The FCC reports the actual number of providers if there are four or more, 
but reports only the existence of at least one provider if there are one to three. For those zip 
codes, we set the number of providers at 2. We generated two zip code-level and two county-
level high speed access measures: the number of providers in the zip code, a dummy variable 
indicating whether there is at least one provider in the zip code, the county-level averages 
corresponding to these measures. All the measures should increase as the probability of 
having local high speed service increases. In addition, a higher number of local high speed 
Internet providers should increase competition among the providers and lower the access 
price. 
The sample statistics are reported in table 1. The working data set includes 2665 
observations on individuals between ages 23 and 65 who are not retired. Younger and older 
respondents are excluded to avoid complications caused by computer adoption and 
commuting decisions that would interact with decisions regarding education and retirement. 
The useable sample is divided between 1,406 respondents in 1999 and 1,259 in 2001. 
All statistics are calculated using the weights provided by CCP. The education level was 
divided into 7 groups: less than 12 years, high school graduate, some college, college 
graduate, master's degree, Ph. D., and professional degrees. We generated a continuous 
measure of education by multiplying the expected years of education for each group.1 The 
average respondent in the working sample was 42 years old and had 13.5 years of education. 
About 60 percent were married. A dummy variable, Minority, was set equal to 1 if an 
individual is neither white nor Asian. About 80 percent are Whites or Asians. Techlove is a 
dummy variable indicating an individual has a taste for technology. Techlove equals 1 if the 
respondent answered positively to the question "Overall, do you think that new technologies 
such as the Internet, cell phones, and pagers have made the world better place, a worse place, 
or neither better nor worse?" Forty five percent thought new technology is good for the world. 
Zip codes were matched to a corresponding county using a file prepared by the 
Bureau of Census from the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) City-State file (November, 1999). 
Counties are defined as metropolitan, urban or rural using Beale codes. In general, higher 
Beale codes imply a more rural county. Metropolitan counties have Beale codes 0 to 3, urban 
counties have codes 4 -7 and rural counties have codes 8 and 9. Non-metropolitan counties 
with codes 4, 6 and 8 are adjacent to a metropolitan area. 
We also generated average travel time from home to work. The Bureau of Census 
data reports total workers in the county aged 16 and older and aggregate travel time to work 
for the county in minutes. We divided the travel time by the total number of workers to get 
average travel time per worker by county, TTIME. We expected that the distance to work 
might affect the reloative incentives to use IT at home versus driving tow work to access IT. 
We also expected that differences in travel time between urban and rural areas might affect 
relative incentives to telecommute in urban versus rural markets. However, there was only a 
modest difference in average commuting time between urban and rural markets. In fact, 
average commuting time is higher by 1.2 minutes in urban than in rural markets. 
Figure 1 through 5 show the percent average of five types of information technology 
uses by Beale code. Five types of uses include use of the Internet for the job at home (IJH), 
use of a computer for the job at home (CJH), use of the Internet at work (IW) use of a 
computer at work (CW) and Internet use for any purposes (IA). Fourteen percent used the 
Internet from their home for work; 32 percent used the Internet at work; 47 percent used a 
computer at work; 19 percent used a computer at home for their job; and 73 percent used the 
Internet for any purposes. In all four job-related cases and the any Internet use, computer and 
the Internet use for work is greatest in the metropolitan areas. In the non-metropolitan 
counties, the use of the information technology is lowest in the rural counties. In urban 
counties, use of information technology at home is bigger in counties not adjacent to a 
metropolitan area. There is a less clear pattern of information technology use at home across 
non-metropolitan counties. The internet use for any purpose shows a similar patter to the use 
of the Internet at work; the use is higher for metropolitan counties than for non-metropolitan 
counties. 
We have two measures of the number of high speed Internet access. One is the 
number of high speed Internet providers in a zipcode (NHZ) being 0, 2, 4 and 5 to 17. The 
other (NHC) is the county level average of NHZ ranging from 0 to 15.25. We also generated 
two measures of high speed Internet access availability based on NHZ and NHC. DHZ, 
generated from NHZ, is a dummy variable indicating whether there is at least one provider in 
a zip code. DHC is the average of DHZ by county, measuring a concentration rate of high 
speed Internet access in a county. The average number of high speed Internet providers in a 
zip code was 3.7, with 90% of respondents having at least one high speed Internet provider 
servicing their zip code. The differences between NHZ and NHC or between DHZ and DHC 
are very small. 
Our focus is to investigate the difference in technology adoption between urban and 
rural areas, and so it is important to define those areas precisely. Past work (Gabe and Abel 
(2002), Fairlie(2004)) has focused on a division of metropolitan versus nonmetropolitan 
areas, but this groups rural counties with suburban counties that may differ little from the 
metropolitan counties. Another option is to group metropolitan counties and counties 
adjacent to the metropolitan area, and to consider all other counties as the rural group (Goetz 
and Rupasingha (2002)). This groups relatively urbanized counties (e.g. Beale Code=5) with 
truly rural counties, that have appreciably lower measures of high-speed access. 
Our working sample is divided into two subgroups by Beale code: the urban group 
and the rural group. The urban group includes counties whose Beale codes are 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 
5 (Metropolitan counties plus Urbanized counties). The rural group includes counties whose 
Beale codes are 6, 7, 8 or 9 (Less Urban counties plus Rural counties). We decided to divide 
our sample in this way for two reasons. One is the population of counties. By the definition 
of Economic Research Service, Non-metropolitan counties (BC = 4-9) are subdivided into 
three groups by urban population in a county: Urbanized counties of 20,000 or more (BC = 4, 
5), Less Urbanized counties of 2,500 to 19,999 (BC = 6,7), and Rural counties of less than 
2,500 (BC = 8,9). The urban population of counties in the urban group is more than 20,000 
and the urban population of counties in the rural group is less than 20,000. The other reason 
is the number of high speed Internet providers in a zipcode by Beale code. As we can see in 
Figure 5, average numbers of NHZ by Beale code are almost same ranging from 2.6 to 2.4 
for Beale codes, 3, 4 and 5. The average numbers NHZ by Beale code are 1.9 for BC = 6 and 
1.6 for BC = 7. For these reasons we found that BC =5 is a reasonable cutoff point for our 
rural-urban division.2 
The second and the third columns of Table 1 report summary statistics for these 
groups. 1,925 observations resided in urban-metro counties and 740 resided in rural counties. 
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The urban group averaged about one year younger than the rural group. The rural group was 
5 percent more likely to be married. Average education is marginally higher in the urban 
group. The urban group was 15 percentage points more likely to hold favorable opinions 
about new information technologies. 
There are significant regional differences in information technology use. For all five 
measures of the Internet and/or a computer uses, the percentage of users is higher in the 
urban group. Urban residents are 6.7 percent more likely to use the Internet at home for work 
purposes; 8.7 percent more likely to use a computer for work at home, 11.3 percent more 
likely to use the Internet at work, 2.3 percent more likely to use a computer at work, and 11.3 
percent more likely to use the Internet for any purposes. The average number of high speed 
Internet access providers is 4.1 in urban areas but only 1.7 in rural areas. Ninety three percent 
urban residents had at least one high speed Internet provider compared to only 72 percent of 
the rural residents. Similar patterns hold when the county average measures of Internet access 
are compared. 
IV. Estimation Model and Results 
First, we estimate the following base technology adoption equation using probit for 
the five binary dependent variables; use of the Internet for the job at home, use of a computer 
for the job at home, use of the Internet at work, use of a computer at work, and use of the 
Internet for any purposes: 
(7) = Jf, /?+777ME, + y fecA We, + <9, AWC, + % AWC' + e,. 
IT, represents one of the five information technology uses; the vector X- includes variables 
such as experience, experience squared, race, gender, marital status, and years of education; 
TT1ME is the average travel time per worker by county; NHC is the average number of high 
speed Internet providers in a county. The techlove is the technology attitude dummy variable. 
To check the consistency of the results, we also estimated the same five equations using 
DHC, NHZ and DHZ. The estimation results were almost identical qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively. 
The use of different measures of Internet access is in part a means of assessing the 
possible role of residential mobility invalidating the treatment of high-speed access as 
exogenous. If people move to areas with access, then local access measures may be 
endogenous. Our use of a 1999 measure mitigates this somewhat, as home access was first 
introduced in 1998, and so households would not have had much time to react. Nevertheless, 
as it is less costly to move across zip codes than across counties, any endogenous mobility is 
more likely to involve moves across zip codes within a county than across counties. In that 
case, the zip code-level data is more likely subject to endogenous moves than would be the 
county-level measures. The lack of large differences across the two sets of measures 
suggests that the problem of households moving to get home Internet access is not a serious 
problem. The other results are available in Table 5 in the Appendix to this chapter. 
Table 2 reports estimated the coefficients and marginal effects from the five probit 
regressions. The estimates of the regressions are consistent with our expectations. Minorities 
(in our case, Blacks and Hispanics) are less likely to engage in all five forms of information 
technology use. The estimated marginal effects range from -0.045 for IJH to -0.138 for CW. 
Married respondents are more likely to use computers or internet at home but not at work. 
Men are more likely to work from home using a computer and the Internet and are also more 
likely to use the Internet at work. More experienced workers are less likely to use the Internet 
at work and to use the Internet for any purposes but are more likely to use computers at work. 
As Huffman and Mercier (1991) found that schooling is important in the farm 
computer service adoption decision, we also found that the years of education increases 
likelihood of adopting all five technology uses. Individuals who are favorably disposed 
toward information technologies generally are also more likely to use the Internet at home or 
at work as well as for any purposes and are also more likely to use computers at home for 
work purposes. Holding human capital, demographic data and attitudes constant, we still find 
evidence that access matters for adoption. The marginal effect of travel time is positive, but 
the size is small and is also statistically insignificant in all 5 equations. It seems that 
differences in travel time among counties may not have a substantial impact on IT adoption. 
The number of high speed Internet providers in a county increases the probability of all the 
technology utilization measures except the use of computers at work, the case least connected 
to high-speed Internet access. The marginal effect of NHC on the use of the Internet for any 
purposes is almost twice as large as the effect on the other four uses. The marginal effect of 
NHC is also larger for home use of the Internet or computers for work purposes but the effect 
is not significant in cases of IT use at work. The pattern of marginal effects is consistent with 
the presumption that high-speed Internet access atypically raises the productivity of Internet 
use and computer use from home, leading to increased telecommuting. 
Regional Comparison: Urban-metro Area vs. Rural Area 
As noted above, there is a gap in Internet and computer use between urban-metro and 
rural areas. Next, we will examine the extent to which these differences can be attributed to 
differences in high-speed Internet access across the two regions. Let Dr be a dummy variable 
indicating rural residence. 
IT = X, /3y+d>x TTIME + / techlove, + 6X NHC, + 0X NHC2 
o\ 1 2 
+ DrX, p1 +Dr <j>2 TTIME + r2 Drtechlove + 02 DrNHC + 02 DrNHC2 +ë,. 
The coefficients /?2,^2, y2,02 and B\ measure the difference in coefficients between the 
urban and the rural samples, where (j)1 measures the rural-urban difference in IT use in 
response to the travel time; y2 measures the rural-urban difference in technology use in 
response to individual taste for technology; 6f and 02 measure the rural-urban difference in 
response to high-speed Internet access; and ft2 measures the difference in the response to the 
other variables in the equation. We define these differences in coefficients between the two 
groups as the structural difference. Individual t-statistics on these coefficients will tell us 
whether the variable has a different effect across urban and rural respondents. The joint test 
of the significance of these coefficients will be a global test of whether there is a significant 
difference in the model of technology use across regions. 
The joint significance tests based on estimation of equation (8) are reported in Table 4 
in the Appendix. The global likelihood ratio test of the null hypothesis 
that/?2 -(fr =7?" = <92 = 6\ =0 could not be rejected at the 5 % significance level for all of the 
technology choices except the case of Internet use at work. For the rest of the four IT uses, 
the null hypothesis can not be rejected at the 10 % significance level. For the use of the 
Internet at work choice, only two coefficients, those on minority and on experience, differed 
significantly across the urban and the rural samples at the 10 % significance level. There are 
no coefficients that significantly differ across urban and rural samples at the 5 % significance 
level. We conclude that there is no significant structural difference between rural and urban 
areas in how probability of work-related computer or Internet use is affected by human 
capital, demographics, attitude toward new information technology or high-speed Internet 
access. 
Decomposition of Regional Gaps in Computer or the Internet Uses 
The lack of significant differences in the parameters of the IT use models between 
urban and rural areas implies that the observed difference can be explained entirely by rural-
urban differences in average human capital, demographics, attitude toward new information 
technology and Internet access. We estimate these impacts using a variation of Blinder-
Oaxaca (Blinder (1973); Oaxaca (1973)) adapted to the probit regression model. The regional 
gaps in the five types of uses of information technology can be expressed as: 
(9) 7r-7r=(Z" _z' + z'(<r-<T), 
where Z' is a vector of average values of the all independent variables and S ' is a vector of 
coefficients for group j. The first term represents the explained portion of the regional 
difference. It is the portion of the gap attributable to group differences in average values of 
the independent variables. The second term represents the unexplained portion of the gap. It 
is the portion attributable to differences in the coefficients between the two groups. As we 
have shown, there is no significant difference in coefficients across rural and urban 
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respondents, so the unexplained portion is insignificant. Because there is no significant 
di f fe rence  in  the  coef f ic ien t s ,  we  use  the  es t imated  parameters  fo r  the  pooled  popula t ions ,  S° .  
The original Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions assumed a linear regression model. 
Since the probability function of a probit model is nonlinear, it cannot be decomposed 
exactly. Some studies use the coefficient estimates from a linear probability model (LPM) to 
approximate the decomposition (e.g. Fairlie (2004) and Kilkenny and Huffman (2003)). The 
potential problem is that the linear probability model is sensitive to outliers in that it is 
possible to have an estimated probability over 1 or under 0. Our strategy uses the estimated 
coefficients from the probit model as follows. The explained difference between urban and 
rural technology use is 
Drr  =F(Z"S") -F(Z r S")  where F is a normal density function. We calculate the share of 
each variable i in explaining this gap by 
' (Z"-Z')<T ' 
where ~zj is an average value of independent variable i in area j and S" is the associated 
coefficient estimate. By multiplying Dit by cci, we can estimate the explained regional 
difference attributable to independent variable /.3 This is the counterpart of (z" -z/ )S,J' that 
is the impact of regional difference in independent variable i calculated using coefficient 
estimates from a LPM. 
Table 3 reports the results from this decomposition. Negative values mean the 
variable lowers the difference between urban and rural areas while positive numbers expand 
the gap. Marital status and gender explain little of the urban-rural gap. Minority status serves 
100 
to shrink the gap. Lower education levels in rural areas explain a substantial fraction of the 
gap. The attitude toward new IT (Techlove) also explains 10 to 22 percent of the gap except 
for use of computers at work. However, differential access, measured by differences in the 
number of high speed Internet providers between rural and urban areas, plays the largest role 
in the differences in adoption rates. Differences in the number of high speed Internet 
providers by county explain 56 percent of the difference in the Internet use for job at home, 
45 percent of the gap in computer use for the job at home, 40 percent of the gap in Internet 
use at work, and 71% of the gap in Internet use for any purposes. The gap in access actually 
lowers the gap in computer use at work by 88 percent. When its impact is positive, Internet 
access matters most in encouraging Internet use from home, either for work or non work 
purposes. 
IV. Conclusions 
We have examined the adoption of new information technologies defined as use of 
the Internet for the job at home, use of a computer for the job at home, use of the Internet at 
work, use of a computer at work and use of the Internet for any purposes using pooled data in 
1999 and 2001. Adoption is positively affected by schooling, and is also correlated with 
gender, race, and marital status. Individuals who have a favorable impression toward new 
technologies are also more likely to use computers and the Internet. However, even when 
those factors are controlled, local access to high speed Internet plays an important role in the 
technology adoption decision. It increases the probability of using computers and the Internet 
for work from home and also increases the likelihood of using the Internet at work. The 
pattern of marginal effects is consistent with the presumption that access is more important 
for telecommuting than for the use of the technology at work. There is no statistically 
significant difference in the coefficients governing the technology adoption process between 
urban and rural areas. This implies that the observed difference in IT uses can be explained 
by rural-urban differences in average human capital, demographics and Internet access. 
Differences in the number of high speed Internet providers by county explain 56 percent of 
the difference in the Internet use for job at home, 45 percent of the gap in computer use for 
the job at home, 40 percent of the gap in Internet use at work, and 71% of the gap in Internet 
use for any purposes. The gap in access actually lowers the gap in computer use at work by 
88 percent. When its impact is positive, Internet access matters most in encouraging Internet 
use from home, either for work or non work purposes. Results suggest that as high-speed 
Internet access increase, there will be increased substitution of telecommuting for commuting. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of-ffae Working Sampte; years 1999 and 20Q1 
Variable 
Total. Sample 
Obs Mean Sid. Err. 
u* 
Obs 
an Sample 
Mean St& Err. 
Rural Sample 
Obs Mean Scd. Ear. 
Maïe WAS 0.462 <0.010] 1925 0.465 (0.011) 740 0.454 (0.018] 
Married 0.583 (0.010] 1925 0.570 (0.011) 740 0.615 (0JD18] 
Age ^66 41^ #.219] 1925 41.6 (0.256) 740 42 7 (0.419] 
Experience -603 22j #.222] 1925 22.0 (0260) 740 23.5 (0.426] 
Education 2665 13J (0 046] 1925 13 d (0.055) 7% 13.2 <0j084] 
Travel Time 2319 24.0 <0.101] 1925 24166 (0.107) 394 23.0 (0^73] 
Technology Merest 2665 0.455 ^.010] 1925 0.498 (0.011) 740 0.347 (0.018] 
Whik 2665 0.771 <P_008] 1925 0.743 (0.010) 740 0.842 (0013] 
Blade W 0.106 g).006] 1925 0.118 (0.007) 740 00"? (0.010" 
Aaan W 0.023 (D.003) 192) 0.028 (0.004) 740 0009 (D.004] 
Native Am. ^66- 0.016 (0.002] 192^ 0.017 (0.003) 740 0011 (0.004] 
NEncnty 2665 0200 (0.008] i92J 0.225 (0.010) 740 0i3v (0.013) 
inteiœl for Job Home 2665 0.137 (0.007] 1925 0.156 (0.008) 740 0089 (0.010] 
Compiler tor Job Home 2665 0.185 <0.008] 1925 0.210 (0.009) 740 0123 (0.012) 
Interne* at Work 2665 0J17 (0.009; 1925 0.349 (0.011) 740 0:236 (0.016] 
Computer at Work 1259 0.466 <0.014] 762 0.475 (0.018) 497 0.452 (0.022] 
AnyMcmctUse 2665 0.727 (0.009] 1925 0.759 (0.010) 740 0.646 (0.018) 
NHZ 2319 3.665 (0.060] 1925 4.091 (0.067) 394 1.657 (0JD64] 
DHZ 2319 0.895 (0.006] 1925 0933 (0.006) 394 0.715 (0.023) 
NHC 2319 3.698 (0.055] 1925 4.130 (0.061) 394 Id# (0.063] 
DHC 2319 0^99 (0.006: 1925 0.937 (0.004) 394 0717 (0.022] 
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Table 3. Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition: 
Weighted Percentage of Exp ained Variation Using Probit Model 
IJH CJH IW cw IA 
Minority 
Married 
Male 
-9.65% 
0.89% 
-4.91% 
-14.62% 
1.26% 
-4.61% 
-17.49% 
0.60% 
-3.84% 
-76.55% 
1.47% 
13.57% 
-10.04% 
0.42% 
-1.57% 
Education 
Experience 
28.3% 
6.1% 
39.5% 
7.6% 
44.4% 
13.0% 
181.2% 
55.5% 
19.3% 
10.1% 
TECHLOVE 
TTIME 
NHC 
19.2% 
3.5% 
56.6% 
22.4^ 
3.5%, 
45.0% 
18.7% 
4.6% 
40.0% 
5.6% 
7.4% 
-88.2% 
10.2% 
0.8% 
70.7% 
Sum 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Figure 1. Use of the Internet for Job at Home by Beale 
Code 
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Figure 2. Use of Computers for Job at Home by Beale code 
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Figure 3. Use of the Internet at Work 
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Figure 4. Use of Computers at Work 
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Figure 5. Internet Use for Any Purposes by Beale Code 
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Figure 6. The Number of High Speed Internet Access 
Providers within a Zipcode by Beale Code 
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Table 7. Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition: 
Weighted Percentage of Explained Variation Linear Probability Model 
IJH CJH IW cw IA 
Minority 
Married 
Male 
-6.84% 
0.95% 
-4.73% 
-10.95% 
1.27% 
-4.33% 
-15.80% 
0.57% 
-3.76% 
-86.57% 
2.04% 
14.87% 
-10.67% 
0.46% 
-1.55% 
Education 
Experience 
33.46% 
5.48% 
44.16% 
6.56% 
46.38% 
12.50% 
198.70% 
56.56% 
16.90% 
10.01% 
TECHLOVE 
TTIME 
NHC 
17.26% 
4.65% 
49.77% 
19.71% 
4.46% 
39.12% 
17.58% 
5.57% 
36.95% 
8.75% 
6.58% 
-100.93% 
10.29% 
0.55% 
74.01% 
Sum 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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1 The equation we used to calculate years of education is Education = 10*(less than H.S.) + 
12*(H.S. Grad.) + 14*(some college education) + 16*(college grad.) +18*(professional 
degree) + 20*(Ph. D.). 
2 We also tried three regional divisions: metro area, urban area and rural area, as the 
percentage of zipcodes in the county with high speed Internet access. As seen in Figure 7 of 
the Appendix, Beale codes can be grouped into "metro" (0-4), "urban" (5-7) and "rural" (8-9). 
We ran the same regressions using this three-way regional division and the results are 
reported in table 4 in the Appendix. The estimated coefficients are almost identical to the 
estimated coefficients with the two-way regional division. 
3 We also calculated the decomposition using the coefficients from the linear probability 
model. The conclusions are unchanged. We report this alternative decomposition in Table 6 
of the Appendix. 
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CHAPTER 5. RETURNS TO COMPUTER AND INTERNET 
TECHNOLOGY USE 
I. Background 
Many studies have examined the relationships between increased computer or 
Internet use and productivity growth in labor or wages. Studies have documented substantial 
growth in information technology related industries, but it is still uncertain whether the 
Internet or computer uses have a causal effect on the pace of productivity or wage growth. 
Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) found that the most computer-intensive sectors of 
the U.S. economy had the fastest growth of demand for skilled labor over the last twenty 
years. They argued that skill-biased technological and organizational changes generated 
faster growth in relative skill demand within these industries. Jorgensen (2001) argued that 
productivity growth in IT-producing industries reduced IT cost and led to a surge in 
economic growth. It is more difficult to establish whether or not the installation of 
information technologies has altered the pace of economic growth. Several studies have 
raised doubts regarding the magnitude of the direct impact of technologies on the 
productivity growth of the economy. Oliner and Sichel (2000), using data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), reported that the labor 
productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s could be tied to the information 
technology. However, Internet usage and e-commerce contributed little to multifactor 
productivity growth during the period. They also speculated that the productivity gains in the 
information technology sector should spill over to productivity growth in the economy as a 
whole. 
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Gordon (2000), using the same 1995-99 data as Oliner and Sichel (2000), reported 
that the Internet had little effect on multifactor productivity growth except in durable 
manufacturing. They argued that since the Internet substitutes for existing communication 
methods and services such as the telephone, books, and music CDs, its impact on 
productivity growth on sectors other than manufacturing is small. Litan and Rivlin (2001) 
were more positive on the role of information technology. They estimated that the total cost 
saving due to the Internet was about 1-2 percent over the five year period from 1995 to 2000. 
They argued that much of benefit of the Internet is through improved consumer convenience 
and expanded choices and improving management efficiencies, rather than in higher 
productivity and lower prices. 
Goss (2001), using data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, and the Current Population Survey, directly estimated the impact of on-the-
job Internet usage on output and productivity growth. He found that it added 0.25 percent to 
annual productivity growth between 1997 and 1999 in all industries. The annual impact of 
Internet usage on productivity growth was larger in the non-IT intensive industries, 0.52 
percent per year, compared a very small 0.03 percent impact on the IT intensive industries. 
Goss argued that, given current low Internet usage rates, there would be significant room for 
enhancing productivity growth by increasing job-related Internet usage, particularly in IT 
intensive industries. 
The causal relationship between computer or Internet use and wage is also a matter of 
debate. Acemoglu (2002) argued that the new information technologies are skill-biased 
technologies so it has accelerated income inequality. Krueger (1993), using data from CPS 
and High School and Beyond (HSB), found that returns to on-the-job computer use was 
122 
about 10 to 15 percent during the 1984-1989 period. Because more educated workers are 
more likely to use computers in the job, he argued that computer use at work contributed to 
between one-third and one-half of the increase in the rate of return to education during the 
period. DiNardo and Pischke (1997), using data from the West German Qualification and 
Career Survey, found that workers who used a computer at work earned about 17 percent 
more in 1985 and about 19 percent more in 1991, similar to Krueger's (1993) results. 
However they also found a 13 percent wage premium from using other tools at work such as 
pencils, calculators, or telephones in 1991. They argued that the link between wages and 
computer use at work is weak at best. Levy and Murnane (1996) examined the impact of 
computers on skill demand in the custodian unit of "Tammany Bank." They found that 
computerization increased the bank's demand for college graduates, although the increase 
was induced by scale effects due to the computers' impact on increasing the size of the 
financial industry rather than the substitution effect from increasing skill requirements within 
the bank. 
Lee and Kim (2004), using the Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted in 1997, 
1998, 2000, and 2001, estimated returns to computer use and Internet use at work. They, first, 
estimated returns to Internet use and returns to computer use in separate wage equations. The 
estimated returns to Internet use at work decreased from 13 percent in 1997 to 5 percent in 
2000. The estimated returns to computer use at work decreased from 14 percent in 1997 to 11 
percent in 2001. When returns to Internet use and returns to computer use were estimated 
together, the returns to Internet use was 8 percent and the returns to computer use was 12 
percent in 1997. Only the 1997 CPS included information on both Internet use at work and 
computer use at work but they calculated an approximate premium to Internet use net of the 
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premium to computer use in 1998 and 2000. This net premium to Internet use was negligible 
in 1998 and -3 percent in 2000.1 Oosterbeek (1996), using longitudinal survey data in the 
Netherlands in 1993, found that workers who use a computer on-the-job earned a wage 
premium of 10 to 20 percent. The return was associated with computer adoption at work and 
not to the frequency of computer use. This result stands against the hypothesis that the return 
to computer use is caused by skill-biased technological change, which implies that more 
frequent computer use should generate higher returns. Therefore, he argued that the return 
from computer use could be attributed to unobserved heterogeneity. 
A few studies tried to control for individual ability or unobserved heterogeneity. 
Entorf and Kramarz (1996), using data in France from 1985 to 1987, found that cross-
sectional estimates of returns to computer use was about 10 percent. However, when 
individual-specific fixed effects estimation is used, the wage premium disappeared. They 
concluded that workers who used computers were already paid better than other workers 
before using the new technology. Krashinsky (2004), using the data from the CPS from 1990 
to 1995, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth in 1993 and 1994, and the data collected 
at the Twinsburg Twins Festival in Twinsburg, Ohio, from 1991 to 1995, found that a wage 
premium associated with computer use that was much smaller than Krueger's (1993) 
estimates after controlling for individual ability with the Armed Forces Qualifying Test 
(AFQT) or a person-specific fixed effect.2 He concluded that workers who use computers at 
work were already more productive than those who do not. Conflicting evidence was found 
by Dolton and Makepeace (2004), using panel data from the UK National Child 
Development Study (NCDS) in 1991 and in 2000. They found that workers who use 
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computers at work earned a wage premium averaging 11% after controlling for individual 
ability and heterogeneity. 
These studies are not free from criticism. It is possible that the endogeneity of new 
technology use would still be problematic, even after controlling for individual heterogeneity 
or individual ability. The fixed-effect model may overcorrect for individual heterogeneity, 
underestimating the wage premium from use of the new technology. 
Liu, Tsou and Hammitt (2004), using data from the 1999 Taiwan Social Change 
Survey, estimated returns to computer use at work. The wage and computer-adoption 
equations are estimated simultaneously to deal with the endogeneity problem of technology 
adoption. To identify the computer-adoption equation, they included measures of attitude 
variables toward computers.3 When computer use was treated as exogenous in the wage 
equation, the estimated return was 15 percent, consistent with Krueger's findings. When the 
simultaneous-equation model was estimated, however, the estimated return to computer use 
fell to 7.5 percent, but was statistically significant. This results support the implication of 
Krueger (1993) that computer use at work increases productivity. Goss and Phillips (2002), 
using data from the CPS from 1997 to 2001, estimated the wage equation and the Internet use 
equation simultaneously, using a state-level school technology index as an identifying 
variable for Internet use. They found a statistically significant wage gain for Internet users of 
13.5 percent, with a range between 4.9 percent and 16.4 percent depending on the intensity of 
technology use in the industry. They also found a smaller Internet use wage premium for 
high-tech industries and a larger Internet use wage premium for low-tech industries. They 
argued that this result might imply that the wage premium would diminish over time as 
technology intensity grows. 
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We investigate this link between use of computer or the Internet and individual wages. 
We have five measures of technology use: use of the Internet for the job at home, use of a 
computer for the job at home, use of the Internet at work, use of a computer at work, and use 
of the Internet for any purposes. We adopt a two step estimation method. First, we estimate a 
technology adoption decision equation using our five technology use measures as dependent 
variables and use its predicted value in the earnings function in the second step estimation, 
the earnings function. Key to the first step of estimation is to have a good instrumental 
variable to identify the technology adoption. We use a measure of high speed Internet access 
and a measure of individual attitude toward new information technology as the instruments 
for the first step. 
Empirical model is discussed in section II. Section III discusses the data, section IV 
discusses the estimation strategy and reports the estimation results. Section V includes the 
conclusions. 
II. Empirical Model 
Our analysis begins with the standard log-earnings framework: 
1) \ny=Xt/3x + //?, + w„ 
where In yt is the observed log earnings of the individual X, is a vector of individual 
demographic and skill characteristics, and 1, is a measure of individual Internet or computer 
use. The w, is unobserved individual heterogeneity plus an error component assumed to be 
randomly distributed. A major concern in estimating equation (1) is that the coefficient on /; 
will be biased if E(I) u,) is not equal to zero. The coefficient of 7, would be upward biased if 
Pj > 0 and Corr(lj, u,) > 0. 
In our application, individuals decide whether or not to use the Internet or a computer. 
This decision involves selecting the option that maximizes expected utility. In functional 
form it can be written as: 
=  0 ) ,  
where U (•) is the expected utility of an individual. Although the utility level is not 
observable, we can observe how the elements of U (•) affect the likelihood of Internet use 
decision. 
If the individual decides whether to use the Internet or a computer in part on the basis 
of expected returns from the usage, then U (•) will also include Then there will be a 
correlation between h and u, and so direct estimation of equation (1) will be biased. If the 
vector Zi shifts the individual's taste for or cost of Internet use but is not directly related with 
individual earnings, then Z, can be used to identify 1, in equation (1). Expected utility from 
choice Ij can be approximated by 
3) /, = JT, + Z, a, + v, , 
where v, is a random disturbance. 
To deal with this endogeneity problem, we use the number of high-speed Internet 
providers in a zip code area as an instrument for Internet or computer use. We assume that E 
( ZjVj ) = 0. Most types of high speed Internet, such as cable modem lines or DSL, are at least 
five times faster than typical telephone modem lines. Availability of high-speed Internet will 
alter the productivity of Internet use. In addition, as the number of high-speed Internet 
providers increases, the competition among them will be intensified and it will decrease the 
cost of high-speed Internet access or will increase the quality of services. 
If the v, is drawn independently from an extreme value distribution, then equation (3) 
can be estimated using probit model. By inserting the predicted probability of Internet use of 
individuals from the estimate into equation (1) in place of the endogenous /„ we can get 
unbiased estimate of /?,. 
III. Description of the Data Set 
The data set analyzed in this paper is a subset of that used in the previous chapter on 
Internet technology adoption. We use only 2001 data since the Center for Communication 
Policy at UCLA included questions about individual income level only in the 2001 survey. 
The descriptive statistics for the data set are reported in table 1. Average years of education 
was 13.5 years, roughly consistent with the U.S. average (Baier et al. (2004)). 
As before, we define four types of new information technology uses: use of the 
Internet for the job at home (IJH), use of a computer for the job at home (CJH), use of the 
Internet at work (IW), use of a computer at work (CW), and use of the Internet for any 
purposes (IA). About 47 percent used a computer at work and 13 percent used a computer at 
home for work purposes. Twenty-seven percent reported using the Internet at work and about 
11 percent used the Internet at home for work. Individuals averaged just over $33,000 in 
annual income. The income distribution is skewed right: the majority earned less than 
$50,000 but 0.2 % earned more than $200,000. 
As in previous chapter, we define the high speed Internet access as the number of 
high speed Internet providers in a zipcode. We have four measures of high speed Internet 
access, the number of high speed Internet providers in a zipcode (NHZ), the average of NHZ 
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by a county (NEC), availability of high speed Internet access in a zipcode (DHZ), and the 
average of NHZ by county (DEC). We only use NEC in our analysis for the same reason in 
the previous chapter; results using the other three measures are similar. The average number 
of high speed Internet providers was 5.2 and about 93 percent of all zipcode areas had at least 
one or more providers. 
IV Estimation and Results 
We analyze returns to technology use under two different assumptions: that the 
technology adoption is exogenous and that the technology use is an endogenous choice based 
on anticipated returns. When exogenous technology use is assumed, we directly estimate the 
earnings function using a dummy variable indicator for each technology use in place of 7, in 
equation (1). That is, 
(4) \nyi=Xi Px+ PIT lTj + ut 
where IT, represents one of the four job related information technology uses; the vector 
includes variables such as experience, experience squared, race, gender, marital status, rural 
region indicator, and years of education.4 
Under the endogenous technology use assumption, first, we estimate the following 
base technology adoption equation (3) using probit for the four binary dependent variables; 
use of the Internet for the job at home, use of a computer for the job at home, use of the 
Internet at work, and use of a computer at work: 
(5) 77] -Xt P + y techlovei +#, NHCj + 02 NHCf +v:. 
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IT, and the vector Xt are same as in equation 5. NHC, and techlovej are two instrumental 
variables: the average number of high speed Internet providers in a county and the 
technology attitude dummy variable, respectively. The predicted value of 77), 77], is inserted 
in place of IT, in equation (4) to get 
(6) \nyi=Xlpx+p,!Ti+ei 
Earnings and Exogenous Computer or Internet Use 
Tables 2 reports the estimation results of the log-earnings function with exogenous 
technology using various specifications. First five columns of Table 2 report estimates of 
earnings functions with only one of the four technology use variables. We also extend 
equation (4) to allow multiple use of information technology. The rest columns report the 
estimation results of specifications with two of the five technology use variables. 
Estimates are consistent with previous studies. Earnings are lower for minorities and 
for those living in rural areas. Males and married persons get higher pay. Turning to the main 
focus, estimated returns to technology adoption are substantial: 53.5 percent for Internet use 
at home; 44.8 percent for computer use at home; 45 percent for Internet use at work; and 47.5 
percent for computer use at work. The return to any Internet use is substantially smaller and 
is only statistically significant at the 10 % level. All four estimates of returns to work related 
technology uses are highly statistically significant. It seems clear that these estimates must 
overstate the true returns as they are even larger than the estimates uncorrected for 
endogeneity that were reported by Krueger (1993) and Dolton and Makepeace (2004). 
Estimated log earnings functions incorporating alternative combinations of exogenous 
technology adoption measures are reported in the last 10 columns of Table 2. Returns to 
technology use are larger at work than at home. Estimated returns to Internet use is larger 
than computer use when they are used at home, estimated returns to computer use is larger 
then Internet use when they are used at work. In general, when two technology uses are 
included, the returns to individual uses falls in comparison to the estimates when the 
technologies are treated separately. That suggests that one reason for the unreasonably large 
estimated returns to individual technology adoption in the top section of Table 2 is that these 
technologies are correlated with a menu of adoptions and not just an isolated technology. 
Nevertheless, the returns to Internet and computer use are still quite large when multiple 
adoptions are allowed. 
Earnings and Endogenous Computer or Internet Use 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of log-earnings function controlling for the 
endogenous use of a computer or the Internet. The probit estimation results of technology 
adoption decision is also reported in Table 4 in Appendix. 
We tested the overidentification restrictions of the instrumental variables used to 
identify the technology adoption equation. We regressed the residuals from the log-earnings 
function (6) on the instruments NHC, HNC2, and techlove. That is, 
(7) ê, =of0+ alNHCl + a2NHCf + a3 techlove. + rjj, 
where <* is the estimated residual from eq. (6) and 77, is a random disturbance. If these NHC, 
NHC2 or techlove are correlated with earnings, then ax * 0, a2 * 0, or a3 * 0. The results are 
reported in Table 5 in Appendix. We cannot reject the joint hypothesis that NHC, NHC2, or 
techlove are endogenous. 
The coefficients of the variables other than technology use are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar between tables 2 and 3. However the estimated coefficients on 
computer or Internet use are very different. The returns to IT uses for job at home are 
positive but the coefficient is substantially smaller when endogeneity is controlled. The other 
two returns to technology use at work change sign. The estimated return to any Internet use is 
larger, but the coefficients of all five technology uses are statistically insignificant. After 
controlling for endogenous decisions regarding technology adoption, the wage premium from 
computer or Internet use disappears. 
These results suggest that the large estimated returns to technology adoption that are 
found when the adoption is viewed as exogenous are due to unmeasured factors that are 
correlated with the adoption. When the choice to adopt is controlled, the estimated returns to 
adoption shrink in both sign and significance, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
there is a zero return to adoption. Thus, while adoption is strongly tied to the availability of 
high-speed Internet in the home county, the higher income of adopters is due to factors that 
raise both the probability of adoption and earnings and not to the adoption per se. As to the 
issue of an urban-rural Internet divide, differential access between urban and rural markets 
does explain differences in adoption rates, but rural residents are not getting lower earnings 
as a result of their lower adoption rates. 
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V. Conclusions 
Since Krueger (1993) and DiNardo and Pischke (1997), the existence of wage 
premium of a computer or the Internet use has been in debate. Most studies that treat 
information technology use as exogenous found positive and statistically significant returns. 
On the other hand, studies that controlled for unobserved individual factors or the 
endogeneity between earnings and information technology use found much smaller and 
sometimes insignificant returns. 
In this study, we dealt with the endogeneity problem by using high-speed Internet 
access as an instrument for technology adoption. The number of high speed Internet 
providers by county increased the probability of using a computer or the Internet for work 
while at home and it also increased the probability of using the Internet at work. After 
controlling for the endogeneity of technology adoption, we conclude that the wage premium 
disappears. 
Card and DiNardo (2002) criticized the view that rising wage inequality is due to 
skill-biased technological change as being inconsistent with stabilized wage inequality in 
1990s when computer related technologies were still advancing. Our findings are consistent 
with their conclusion that the premium associated with using computers or the Internet is due 
to higher wage workers using computers and not because computers raise wages for those 
using them. The results suggest that the large estimated returns to technology adoption that 
are found when the adoption is viewed as exogenous are due to unmeasured factors that are 
correlated with the adoption. When the choice to adopt is controlled, the estimated returns to 
adoption shrink in both sign and significance. Thus, while adoption is strongly tied to the 
availability of high-speed Internet in the home county, the higher income of adopters is due 
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to factors that raise both the probability of adoption and earnings and not to the adoption per 
se. We also found that differential access between urban and rural markets does explain 
differences in adoption rates, but rural residents are not getting lower earnings as a result of 
their lower adoption rates. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of t îe Working Sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. 
Male 1259 0.472 (0.014) 
Married 1259 0.583 (0.014) 
Age 1259 43.4 (0.329) 
Experience 1259 23.9 (0.335) 
Education 1259 13.5 (0.066) 
Technology Interest 1259 0.297 (0.013) 
White 1259 0.747 (0.012) 
Black 1259 0.122 (0.009) 
Asian 1259 0.028 (0.005) 
Native Am. 1259 0.023 (0.004) 
Minority 1259 0.211 (0.012) 
Rural Area 1259 0.400 (0.014) 
Internet Job Home 1259 0.111 (0.009) 
Computer Job Home 1259 0.129 (0.009) 
Internet at Work 1259 0.269 (0.013) 
Computer at Work 1259 0.466 (0.014) 
Internet For Any Purposed 1259 0.734 (0.012) 
NHZ 924 5.224 (0.112) 
DHZ 924 0.930 (0.008) 
NHC 924 5.286 (0.102) 
DHC 924 0.932 (0.007) 
Income (2001 dollar) 845 33224 (879) 
Table 2.. L og- earnings Function E stim ation Results with Es ogenous T echrtology U ses 
Variable Coef. Std. E sr. Coef. Std. Err. Cerf. S M. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std Err. 
DH 
CJH 
IW 
CW 
IA 
0.533 (0 064) 
0.448 (0.070) 
0.450 (0.056) 
0.475 (0.051) 
0.129 (0.073) 
KSnority 
Married 
Male 
Rural B ack ground 
-0.070 (0.065) 
0.456 (0.050) 
0.120 (0.065) 
-0.139 (0.05Z) 
-0.071 (0.066) 
0.113 g).065) 
0.461 (PJ050) 
-0.139 (0.052) 
-0.041 (0.068) 
0.106 (0.065) 
0.442 (0.051) 
-0.143 (0049) 
-0.037 (0.066) 
0.092 (0.061) 
0.475 (0.0%) 
-0162 (0.049) 
4.071 (0.069) 
0.127 (OJO6Q 
0.457 (0.052) 
-0.155 (0.052) 
Eeteeatim 
Expenence'lO 
(Ex periemce/10)2 
0J083 (0.011) 
0226 (0.083) 
-0.042 (0.017) 
0.084 (0.011) 
0.227 (0.082) 
-0.042 (0.017) 
0.077 (0.011) 
0.265 (0.078) 
-0.047 (0.016) 
0.079 (0.010) 
0.182 (0.079) 
-0.027 (0.016) 
0.104 (OJOII) 
0287 (0.081) 
-0.054 (0.017) 
Constant 8.496 (0.163) 
0361 
8.483 (0.163) 
0.349 
8.458 (0.164) 
0.379 
8.400 (0.137) 
0.406 
8.115 (0.158) 
0J11 
Obs: 647 
Tabic 2. (coaf d) 
\ asable Coef. Std. Err. Coef Std Err. Coef. Sid. Enr. Coef. Std Err. Coef Std. En. 
DH 0.527 (0.2D3) 0298 (0.074) 0.357 (0.064) 0324 (0.064) 
CJH 0.006 (0.198) 0.258 (0.075) 
IW 0340 (0.061) 0.370 (0.060) 
CW 0.408 (D.052) 
IA 0.101 (0.072) 
kEnonty -0.070 (0.065) -0.041 (0.066) -0.030 (0063) -0.054 (0.W5) -0.038 (0.067) 
Marncd 0.130 (0 065) 0.105 (0.064) 0.088 (0.060) 0.115 (0.064) 0 099 (0.064) 
Male 0.45(5 (0.050) 0.443 (0.050) 0.469 (0.048) 0.452 (0.050) 0 444 (0.050) 
Rum Background -0.138 (0.052) -0.133 (0.050) -0.143 (0.049) -0.130 (0.052) -0.131 (0.050) 
Education 0.082 (0 011) 0.070 (0.011) 0.06S (0.010) 0.079 (0.011) 0.068 (0.011) 
Ezpcooncs/10 0.225 (0 082) 0.238 (0.079) 0.160 (0.079) 0232 (0.083) 0^37 (0.079) 
-0.041 ^0.017) -0.042 (0.017) -0.023 (DO17) -0.042 (0.017) -0.041 (0.017) 
Coastajtt 8.497 (0.162) 8573 (0.166) !1591 (0.160) 8.455 (0.165) 8.591 (0.165) 
0.361 0392 0.429 0364 0391 
Table 2, (conf d> 
Variable Cœf. Std. Emr. Coef Std. Err. Coef. Std. En. Coc£ Std. En. Cœf Std. Eir. 
DH 
CJH 
IW 
CW 
% 
0257 (0.070) 
0.417 (0.052) 
0.440 (0.07Q 
0.102 (0.072) 
0.206 (D.066) 0.445 (0.057) 
0362 (0.063) 
0.032 (0.074) 
0.471 (0451] 
0.025 (0471) 
} fmcnty 
Nferaed 
\Wc 
ferai Badcgmoiid 
-0.031 (0.064) 
0.085 (D.061) 
0.472 (0(M9) 
-0J46 fOOW) 
-0.054 (0.066) 
0.109 (0.065) 
0.456 (04SQ 
-0.130 (0.053) 
-0.026 (0.066) -0.036 (0.06% 
0.089 (0.062) 0.104 (0464) 
0.463 (0.050) 0.441 (00)1) 
-0.152 (0.048) -0.141 (0050) 
-0.(333 (0.06$ 
0.091 #46!) 
0.474 (0450) 
-0.160 (0449) 
Education 
Experimce/10 
(Experieaœ/lOf 
Constant 
0.068 <0.011) 
0.1<B (0.078) 
-0.023 (0.016) 
8.555 (0.162) 
0.080 (0.011) 
0233 (0.081) 
-0.042 (0417) 
8.441 (0.165) 
0.071 (0.011) 0.076 (0.011) 
0.198 (0.078) 0267 (0.078) 
-0.030 (0.016) -0447 (0.016) 
8.479 (0 160) 8.443 (0.167) 
0.078 (0411) 
0.184 (0478] 
-0.027 (D.016] 
83» (0.159] 
0.419 0352 0.416 0379 0.406 
Table 3. Lcgj-eaamags F«K#om E sAm Results with Endogenous T echnologv U ses 
V a'iatie Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Stâ Err. Coef. S&LEtr. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Stâ Err. 
UH 0.177 (0.405) 
CJH 0.121 (0.3S7) 
IW -0.081 (0362) 
CW -1.183 (0.856) 
IA 0291 (0.432) 
Minority -0 0S4 (0.070) -0.085 (0.073) -0.101 (0495) 4.243 (0 135) -0.068 (0.074) 
Married 0.125 (0.070) 0.127 (0.071) 0.137 (0.071) 0.164 (0.080) 0111 (0.071) 
Male 0.457 (0O51) 0.459 (0.055) 0.466 (0.062) 0.410 (0.070) 0.450 (0.058) 
Rural B ackground -0.158 (0.055) -0.160 (0.057) -0.173 (0.072) -0.22% (0.0*3) -0.150 (0.063) 
Education 0.100 (0.022) 0.102 (0.024) 0.115 (0442) 0.190 (0.059) 0.095 (0.024) 
Experimce/lO 0.264 (0.001) 0.267 (0.095) 0285 (0.092) 0.509 (0.193) 0301 (0.087) 
CExperieoce'lO):* -0.051 (0.019) -0.052 (0.021) -0.057 (0.021) -0.118 (0.049) -0.055 (0 018) 
Constant 8.273 (0.399) 8.246 (0J20) 8.105 (0.417) 7^78 (0.459) 8.096 (0.178) 
0.306 0.306 0J06 0.308 0.307 
Obs: 617 
Tabl 4, Prolit Estimation Resalts of Each InfemattoB Tedtookgy Adoption 
DH CJH IW cw m 
VzmaMcs Coef, Stâ Err. Coef Std Err. Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err. Coef. Std Err. 
Mîncnty 
Earned 
Male 
-0305 (0217) 
0316 (0.130) 
0184 (0J28) 
-0354 (0208) 
03<K (01%) 
0.12B (0123) 
-0.415 (0.162) 
0.156 (0.108) 
0.173 (0.104) 
-0353 (01144) 
0.057 (0.103) 
-4.136 (0.100) 
-0299 (0.155) 
0267 (0.113) 
0204 (0.111) 
Education 
Experience/10 
(E^eneno8/10)F 
Rmal Area 
0233 (0.025) 
0.820 (0248) 
-0234 (0.053) 
-0.093 (0218) 
0235 (0.025) 
0.752 (0256) 
-0201 (0.057) 
-0.101 (0202) 
0230 (0421) 
0277 (0.192) 
-0.098 (0.039) 
-0.103 (0 .166) 
0.199 (0.022) 
0.645 (0.179) 
-0.1% (0.036) 
-0160 (0.150) 
0246 (0.035) 
-0.505 (0206) 
0.045 (0.039) 
-0.165 (0.168) 
Technology Interest 
NHOIO 
(KHOlOf 
0.158 (0.139) 
1.405 (0J88) 
-0.862 (0.602) 
0091 (0.134) 
1356 (0.7(B) 
-0.770 (0.608) 
-04» (0.112) 
0.606 (0.653) 
-0290 (0.4») 
0417 (0.106) 
-0.194 (0.633) 
0.095 (0.497) 
0.0@ (0.118) 
1316 (0.688) 
-1.103 (0.544) 
Constant -5.701 (0_508) -5.567 (0.499) -3.997 (0.408) -1890 (0.397) -L992 (0.557) 
Pseudo R2 02Z7 0225 0.175 0.142 0.185 
Qbs: 924 
Table 5. Ovetidentifi ratio® Test for Instrumental Variables Resalts 
vahaWr UH resdtel CM residuai IW residual CW readual IA residual 
Cœf. Std. EÎÎ. CoeC Std Err Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
MHC 
NHC  ^
Tcddovc 
Constant 
-0058 (0.052) 
0.039 (0.092) 
-0003 (0.003) 
-0064 (0.074) 
4.055 (0.052) 
0.040 (0432) 
-0.003 (0.009) 
-0.067 (0.075) 
-0456 (0.052) 
0.042 (0432) 
-0.003 (0.003] 
-0475 (0.075) 
-0447 (0452) 
0435 (0.032) 
-0.003 (0.003) 
-0456 (0.074) 
-0.058 (0452) 
0.031 (0.032) 
-0.003 (0.003) 
-0.051 (0474) 
R? 0.0059 0.0058 04062 0.0046 0.0045 
3^2 3.75 441 2.98 2.91 
-Obs.*R ;^ a* level -&25 
143 
1 Their approximation appears somewhat unreliable. Applying their method to calculate the 
net premium to Internet use in 1997 results in a 2.4 percent return compared to the 7.7 
percent return from the direct estimation. That suggests that their approximation may be 
severely biased downward. 
2 Using the twins data, he found about 7 percent of the wage premium of computer use at 
work after controlling for person-specific fixed-effect but it was not statistically significant. 
3 One variable is about the attitude of an individual on the computer in general and the other 
variable is about the attitude of an individual on how to use the computer at work or for 
leisure. For detail see Liu et al. (1997). 
4 We also estimate specifications with more than one technology use. 77,, in those 
specifications, will be a vector. 
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CHAPTER 6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
We investigated two plausible factors that may have contributed to rising wage 
inequality over the past 30 years: returns to higher education and returns to adoption of 
information technologies. 
In chapter 2, we estimated returns to advanced degrees and direct returns to 
mathematics and verbal skills by college major. We found that OLS estimates of returns to 
graduate education are underestimated when controls for average ability by major are 
missing. When controls for average ability are included, returns to post-graduate education 
rise by about 11%. As argued in the paper, these are lower bound estimates of the true return 
if the covariance between years of schooling and individual ability have the same sign as the 
associated covariance between major average ability and years of schooling. Our result 
differs from findings in previous studies that focused on lower levels of education. At lower 
levels of schooling, students with more mathematics ability are more likely to attend college 
because returns to cognitive skills and returns to additional schooling are relatively larger 
than the opportunity cost of schooling. After attaining the bachelor's degree, my results 
suggest that the opportunity cost of post-graduate education dominate the returns to 
schooling for those with the most mathematical ability, but not for those with the greatest 
verbal ability 
Average GRE verbal and quantitative scores by college major play an important role 
in explaining earnings variation. Returns to the major average GRE quantitative score are 
positive while returns to the major average GRE verbal score are negative. Rising GRE 
quantitative scores in the 1980s and falling GRE verbal scores since the mid 1970s have both 
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contributed to the rising earnings for college graduates. The simulated earnings differential 
attributed to changes in the average GRE quantitative and verbal scores by college major is 
about 2.6 percent or $ 1,609 in constant 1993 dollars. 
Changes in the distribution of major on earnings by cohort also have had an impact 
on the earnings for college graduates. Researches have found that college majors play 
important role in explaining wage variation. Some majors get paid more than others. The 
simulated earnings paths in Figure 7 show that choice of college major caused average 
returns to college to fall in the 1960's and early 70's, and increase since the mid 1970s. 
Freeman (1976) argued that low returns to college degrees in late 1960's and early 1970's 
were due to excess supply of college graduates, but the low returns were also apparently due 
to a disproportionate concentration of college students in lower paying majors. 
In chapter 3, we investigated the same topic as in chapter 2 but focusing on the role of 
ability in sorting college graduates into different degree programs. We identified the 
schooling decision equation using parents' education level and schooling cost measures as 
instruments. This two step approach allowed us to investigate how the major level skills 
affect schooling decision as well as its direct returns. 
Estimated returns to advanced degrees are positive and significant and are even larger 
than those found in chapter 2. Because of the inability to control for individual ability 
within the major, the chapter 2 results were lower bound estimates. Controlling for this 
unobserved source of heterogeneity in chapter 3 does lead to larger returns as hypothesized in 
chapter 2. 
The estimation results pointed out an interesting role for cognitive skills in the market 
for advanced degrees. Students in majors with higher average quantitative GRE scores are 
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less likely to attend graduate school, even though such students presumably are more likely 
to be successful in graduate education. The opposite happens for verbal skills. This leads to a 
sorting effect whereby students whose cognitive skills would suggest lower earnings at the 
bachelor's level are more likely to attend graduate school. This sorting effect appears to be 
part of the cause of the downward bias in estimated returns to graduate education—the 
average earnings of those who do not go to graduate school overstate the opportunity costs of 
graduate education for those who do pursue advanced degrees. 
In chapter 4 we examined factors that might affect the adoption of new information 
technologies and urban-rural difference in the adoption. Adoption is positively affected by 
schooling, and is also correlated with gender, race, and marital status. Individuals who have a 
favorable impression toward new technologies are also more likely to use computers and the 
Internet. However, even when those factors are controlled, local access to high speed Internet 
plays an important role in the technology adoption decision. It increases the probability of 
using computers and the Internet for work from home and also increases the likelihood of 
using the Internet at work. The pattern of marginal effects is consistent with the presumption 
that access is more important for telecommuting than for the use of the technology at work. 
There is no statistically significant difference in the coefficients governing the technology 
adoption process between urban and rural areas. This implies that the observed difference in 
IT uses can be explained by rural-urban differences in average human capital, demographics 
and Internet access. Difference in the number of high speed Internet access by county 
explains 44 percent of the difference in the Internet use for job at home, 40 percent of the gap 
in computer use for the job at home, 32 percent of the gap in Internet use at work and 50% of 
the gap in Internet use for any purposes, but only -7.6 percent of the gap in computer use at 
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work. Internet access matters most in encouraging any Internet use and work from home. 
Results suggest that as high-speed Internet access increase, there will be increased 
substitution of telecommuting for commuting. 
In chapter 5 we investigated returns to computer and Internet uses. Previous studies 
have found positive and statistically significant returns to computer or Internet use when 
adoption is assumed to be exogenous. On the other hand, studies that controlled for 
unobserved individual factors or the endogeneity between earnings and information 
technology use found much smaller and sometimes insignificant returns. In this chapter, we 
dealt with the endogeneity problem by using high-speed Internet access as an instrument for 
technology adoption. The number of high speed Internet providers in the home county 
increased the probability of home use of a computer or the Internet for work purposes and it 
also increased the probability of using the Internet at work. After controlling for the 
endogeneity of technology adoption, we conclude that the wage premium disappears. 
Our findings are consistent with their conclusion that the premium associated with 
using computers or the Internet is due to higher wage workers using computers and not 
because computers raise wages for those using them. The results suggest that the large 
estimated returns to technology adoption that are found when the adoption is viewed as 
exogenous are due to unmeasured factors that are correlated with the adoption. When the 
choice to adopt is controlled, the estimated returns to adoption shrink in both sign and 
significance. Thus, while adoption is strongly tied to the availability of high-speed Internet 
in the home county, the higher income of adopters is due to factors that raise both the 
probability of adoption and earnings and not to the adoption per se. We also found that 
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differential access between urban and rural markets does explain differences in adoption rates, 
but rural residents are not getting lower earnings as a result of their lower adoption rates. 
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